Which versions of @astralcore/sl-aura are malicious?

The following npm versions of @astralcore/sl-aura are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @astralcore/sl-aura if I installed it?

@astralcore/sl-aura is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @astralcore/sl-aura — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @astralcore/sl-aura was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is @astralcore/sl-aura part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @astralcore/sl-aura is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015826, IN-MAL-2026-016500, IN-MAL-2026-016504, IN-MAL-2026-016499, IN-MAL-2026-016501 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @astralcore/sl-aura across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @astralcore/sl-aura (5 malicious versions).

Malicious package

@astralcore/sl-auranpm

Advisory published Aug 5, 2026Updated Aug 6, 2026

@astralcore/sl-aura is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13355) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @astralcore/sl-aura (npm)

MAL-2026-13355

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @astralcore/sl-aura

What this malware does

This WhatsApp bot package ships several mechanisms that give the author persistent remote control of any installer's running instance and access to the installer's WhatsApp account. config.env and config/index.js hardcode OWNER_NUMBERS (falling back to '94726800969' when unset) that parser.js uses to set isCreator/isOwner; src/commands/filemanager.js exposes creator-gated WhatsApp commands (.getfile,.putfile,.mkdir,.fullzip) that read arbitrary files under the bot project root, overwrite files, and zip the entire project tree back to the remote party — giving the hardcoded author numbers full file read/write and full-tree exfiltration over WhatsApp. config/index.js also defaults MONGODB_URI to 'mongodb+srv://unity-free:[email protected]/...', and src/commands/index.js persists the Baileys auth state (creds and signal keys — the full auth material for the paired WhatsApp account) into that database via useMongoDBAuthState, so an installer running with shipped defaults uploads their WhatsApp session credentials to a cluster whose credentials are controlled by the author, enabling remote account takeover. config.env additionally ships live TG_PAIR_BOT_TOKEN and TG_SUPER_BOT_TOKEN plus hardcoded TG_ADMIN_IDS; src/telegram/superBot.js polls these tokens at startup and gates commands (/pair, downloads, session management) on isAdmin() matching those hardcoded IDs, providing a second remote-control channel into every default-configured installer. The package also ships additional third-party credentials belonging to the author (Gemini API key, Gmail SMTP app password, dashboard secret/password).

Malicious versions

5 flagged

1.0.01.0.11.0.41.0.51.0.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

91ae2c72e5e03d23f3f5704859e8c92b9ce6c565c6d14d744d4382b980a0d233

ad1b9a5639b6cd7ec75d55d5201a4c899a0c83493837a83659ad0b499d92519d

f3dae0fadf870b0a1b0cf2560c0a9c070e9b59d0151aa73cbf33dcb32a8aeeed

96b843d40810ff0e688b7567c92de2c5577562063f85be51c568cd7f941148d9

991a98ef37ae2e17736c4ead8b8a0fb22b0f32d03792fb831c48fccf4058f1e2

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @astralcore/sl-aura (5 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@astralcore/sl-aura is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @astralcore/sl-aura was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @astralcore/sl-aura on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015826IN-MAL-2026-016500IN-MAL-2026-016504IN-MAL-2026-016499IN-MAL-2026-016501

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @astralcore/sl-aura-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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