@astralcore/sl-auranpm
@astralcore/sl-aura is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13355) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @astralcore/sl-aura (npm)
What this malware does
This WhatsApp bot package ships several mechanisms that give the author persistent remote control of any installer's running instance and access to the installer's WhatsApp account. config.env and config/index.js hardcode OWNER_NUMBERS (falling back to '94726800969' when unset) that parser.js uses to set isCreator/isOwner; src/commands/filemanager.js exposes creator-gated WhatsApp commands (.getfile,.putfile,.mkdir,.fullzip) that read arbitrary files under the bot project root, overwrite files, and zip the entire project tree back to the remote party — giving the hardcoded author numbers full file read/write and full-tree exfiltration over WhatsApp. config/index.js also defaults MONGODB_URI to 'mongodb+srv://unity-free:[email protected]/...', and src/commands/index.js persists the Baileys auth state (creds and signal keys — the full auth material for the paired WhatsApp account) into that database via useMongoDBAuthState, so an installer running with shipped defaults uploads their WhatsApp session credentials to a cluster whose credentials are controlled by the author, enabling remote account takeover. config.env additionally ships live TG_PAIR_BOT_TOKEN and TG_SUPER_BOT_TOKEN plus hardcoded TG_ADMIN_IDS; src/telegram/superBot.js polls these tokens at startup and gates commands (/pair, downloads, session management) on isAdmin() matching those hardcoded IDs, providing a second remote-control channel into every default-configured installer. The package also ships additional third-party credentials belonging to the author (Gemini API key, Gmail SMTP app password, dashboard secret/password).
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @astralcore/sl-aura (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @astralcore/sl-aura across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@astralcore/sl-aura is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @astralcore/sl-aura was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @astralcore/sl-aura before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @astralcore/sl-aura-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.