@astralcore/aura-wbnpm
@astralcore/aura-wb is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13413) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @astralcore/aura-wb (npm)
What this malware does
The package is a WhatsApp (Baileys) bot whose default configuration in config/index.js points MONGODB_URI at a hardcoded shared Atlas cluster (mongodb+srv://unity-free:[email protected]) with credentials embedded in the source. When an installer starts the bot without overriding MONGODB_URI, useMongoDBAuthState() in src/commands/index.js writes the full Baileys creds and signal keys — the noise key, signal identity key, registration, and session keys that grant complete control of the installer's WhatsApp account — to that author-controlled database. src/commands/boostWatcher.js opens on 'connection open' and polls the same shared MongoDB every 20 seconds for BoostJob documents, then drives followNewsletter, newsletterReactMessage, and readMessages against the installer's paired WhatsApp session for each job. Because the DB credentials are shared and hardcoded, anyone with the source (including the author) can read every installer's WhatsApp session material and enqueue jobs that command every installer's WhatsApp identity to follow, react to, or view arbitrary channels. Additional install-time and command paths in start.js, src/commands/boost.js, and src/telegram/notify.js post host information (os.platform, os.arch, process.env) to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage using a hardcoded owner chat_id 7752365037, providing the author install-time notifications on every deployment. A Google Tenor API key is also embedded in src/commands/extra_media.js.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @astralcore/aura-wb (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @astralcore/aura-wb across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@astralcore/aura-wb is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @astralcore/aura-wb was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @astralcore/aura-wb before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @astralcore/aura-wb-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.