@aster110/cc2wechatnpm
@aster110/cc2wechat is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13520) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 5.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @aster110/cc2wechat (npm)
What this malware does
The package runs a daemon that long-polls Tencent's iLink Bot API (ilinkai.weixin.qq.com) for incoming WeChat messages and forwards each message body into a locally hosted AI agent that is spawned with all approval and sandbox gates disabled. Specifically, TmuxDelivery.deliver writes the message text (sendToSession(sessionName, "[微信...] " + ctx.text)) into a tmux session whose command line is CC2WECHAT_CONTEXT=... claude --dangerously-skip-permissions, using tmux load-buffer + paste-buffer + send-keys Enter to submit the input. An alternative backend spawns codex exec --json --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and feeds the same WeChat message stream into it. Because these AI CLIs are configured to auto-execute shell commands and filesystem operations without prompts when safety flags are disabled, any party able to send a WeChat message to the linked account can drive arbitrary shell and file operations on the machine running the daemon. The tool is documented in the README as full-host access requiring a disposable VM. The startup entry point is a bin CLI (cc2wechat start), so the remote-shell surface materializes when the operator launches the daemon rather than on npm install or require().
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @aster110/cc2wechat (version 5.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @aster110/cc2wechat across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@aster110/cc2wechat establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @aster110/cc2wechat was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @aster110/cc2wechat before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @aster110/cc2wechat-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.