@asavie/i18nnpm
Malicious code in @asavie/i18n (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@asavie/[email protected] is a dependency-confusion package targeting an unclaimed npm scope. Its package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs node callback.js, which on npm install reads os.hostname() and the output of whoami (callback.js L23, L28) and transmits them to the attacker-controlled out-of-band collector d88r3mao12pqka8tg04gn4ychek66c3wj.oast.site (an Interactsh subdomain) via both a DNS A-record lookup and an https.get() request with the data base64url-encoded into the subdomain (callback.js L21, L37, L46). Version 99.0.0 and the squat on the @asavie scope are the canonical dependency-confusion shape — any build that mistakenly resolves this scope from public npm leaks identifying host data to the publisher. The tarball additionally ships an unrelated ~123 MB google-chrome-stable_current_amd64.deb that is not referenced by any code path; it is not executed but represents either staging or registry abuse. Author claims of 'authorized research' are unverifiable by installers and do not change the installer-side outcome: unsolicited exfiltration of host identifiers on npm install.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@asavie/i18n' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @asavie/i18n (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @asavie/i18n across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@asavie/i18n is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @asavie/i18n was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @asavie/i18n before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @asavie/i18n-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.