@arv-bedrock/auth-sso-backendnpm

npm/@arv-bedrock/auth-sso-backend is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs that downloads the Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js], {cwd:D}) to run a package-local file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line heavily obfuscated bundle (header // @bun @bun-cjs, hex-name identifiers, a multi-thousand-entry mixed literal array driving a rotating string-array decoder function WV8StW). The obfuscated payload is not referenced from the declared library entrypoint (dist/cjs/index.js) and is not listed in package.json.files (which allows only dist/**/*); it exists in the tarball solely to be executed by the preinstall dropper. Package metadata is placeholder (author: "", description: "") and the README contains only pipeline-trigger notes, with no relation to the advertised SSO-backend purpose. Executing under a freshly downloaded alternate runtime bypasses Node-based install-time monitoring, and the opaque payload's behavior cannot be inspected by the installer.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.