Which versions of @array-util/nodepull are malicious?

The following npm versions of @array-util/nodepull are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @array-util/nodepull if I installed it?

@array-util/nodepull is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @array-util/nodepull — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @array-util/nodepull was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @array-util/nodepull part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @array-util/nodepull is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-006946, IN-MAL-2026-006947, IN-MAL-2026-006948 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @array-util/nodepull across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @array-util/nodepull (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @array-util/nodepull across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@array-util/nodepullnpm

Malicious code in @array-util/nodepull (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6084

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @array-util/nodepull

What this malware does

@array-util/[email protected] ships a single 19 KB obfuscated index.js as its main entry. On require()/import, the IIFE silences process error handlers via process.on('uncaughtException',...) and process.on('unhandledRejection',...), builds a URL by chained string.replace() calls to reassemble dotted host/path tokens, loads os/fs/path/child_process plus an HTTP client, downloads a remote resource, writes the response body to path.join(os.tmpdir(), <name>) with flag 'w+', and executes the dropped file via child_process.exec with {windowsHide: true, cwd: process.cwd()}. The string array, decoder (custom-base64 + RC4 via function c(b,d)), and control-flow flattening (obfuscator.io output, ~814 transforms per webcrack) conceal the URL, dropped filename, and exec target so URL/IP pattern scanners cannot read them. Package metadata is hollow (empty description, empty author, ISC license, no documented API; README only shows an install line and a bare require()) — there is no legitimate functionality, only the dropper. Any developer or build system that installs and require()s this package fetches and executes attacker-controlled code under the installer's UID with errors silenced.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.0.01.1.01.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

bcafb3a6336948fd12673cfe88d505e2a036afcfb5e9ee5d4b850cf982753d9b

c171d764fc1dd7e67c3a09b1092c94ae915786d3776a1246c916f153095a92cb

e5a36af206cdff9358c1d3357469fd896fb1607d2401b6f035aaaf35451babac

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @array-util/nodepull (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @array-util/nodepull across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@array-util/nodepull is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @array-util/nodepull was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @array-util/nodepull before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @array-util/nodepull on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-006946IN-MAL-2026-006947IN-MAL-2026-006948

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @array-util/nodepull-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring