@array-util/nodepullnpm

@array-util/[email protected] ships a single 19 KB obfuscated index.js as its main entry. On require()/import, the IIFE silences process error handlers via process.on('uncaughtException',...) and process.on('unhandledRejection',...), builds a URL by chained string.replace() calls to reassemble dotted host/path tokens, loads os/fs/path/child_process plus an HTTP client, downloads a remote resource, writes the response body to path.join(os.tmpdir(), <name>) with flag 'w+', and executes the dropped file via child_process.exec with {windowsHide: true, cwd: process.cwd()}. The string array, decoder (custom-base64 + RC4 via function c(b,d)), and control-flow flattening (obfuscator.io output, ~814 transforms per webcrack) conceal the URL, dropped filename, and exec target so URL/IP pattern scanners cannot read them. Package metadata is hollow (empty description, empty author, ISC license, no documented API; README only shows an install line and a bare require()) — there is no legitimate functionality, only the dropper. Any developer or build system that installs and require()s this package fetches and executes attacker-controlled code under the installer's UID with errors silenced.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.