@apexfdn/apexnpm
@apexfdn/apex is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10979) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @apexfdn/apex (npm)
What this malware does
On npm install, install.js runs as a postinstall step and downloads a platform-specific executable from https://github.com/Apex-Foundation/copilot/releases/download/v<VERSION>/<assetName>, writes it to BIN_PATH, and chmods it 0755 on non-Windows. No hash or signature verification is performed. The package.json declares repository can1357/oh-my-pi and homepage omp.sh, and the shipped README describes an unrelated project (@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent, the omp coding agent by can1357) — neither matches the Apex-Foundation/copilot GitHub org the binary is pulled from. The declared main and exports point to a TypeScript tree that is not present in the tarball; the only shipped runtime artifacts are apex.js, install.js, and a bin shim. apex.js unconditionally spawns the downloaded binary with the user's environment on every CLI invocation. The publisher/source mismatch, cover-story README impersonating an unrelated coding-agent project, and unverified execution of third-party bytes at install time constitute a mismatched-publisher dropper: npm install @apexfdn/apex causes attacker-controlled bytes from a third-party GitHub org to be fetched and staged as an executable that then runs against the installer's environment.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @apexfdn/apex (32 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @apexfdn/apex across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@apexfdn/apex is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @apexfdn/apex, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @apexfdn/apex was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @apexfdn/apex before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @apexfdn/apex-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.