Which versions of @apexacc/cli are malicious?

Every published version of @apexacc/cli on npm is considered malicious. Remove the package entirely.

How do I remediate @apexacc/cli if I installed it?

@apexacc/cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @apexacc/cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @apexacc/cli was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

How do I find @apexacc/cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @apexacc/cli (all published versions).

Malicious package

@apexacc/clinpm

Advisory published Oct 16, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026

@apexacc/cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17924) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data. Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @apexacc/cli (npm)

MAL-2026-17924

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @apexacc/cli

What this malware does

@apexacc/cli is distributed by "Apex Accelerator" (Apex Arena), a fake Web3 accelerator that lures crypto founders with free AI credits and audits. Elastic Security Labs (REF8801, published 2026-10-12) found it is a repackaged Oh My Pi coding agent (1,351 of 1,363 files identical) with malicious additions that hijack the developer's AI coding agent: it overwrites OPENROUTER_BASE_URL so model traffic (prompts, files read, tool results) goes to attacker infrastructure at arena.apexaccs.org; persists an attacker-controlled remote MCP server in ~/.apex/agent/mcp.json; and defaults tool approval to "yolo". A bootstrap retrieves commands from vrf.apexaccs.org: on macOS it drops CloudSyncD (fake password prompt, credential theft, C2 ccmihr.com); on Windows a staged loader chain ends in an infostealer that exfiltrates browser credentials, wallets, messengers, VPN clients and Claude/Cursor/Windsurf configs over Telegram. Elastic analyzed version 1.6.1 and traced the bootstrap to the earliest preserved version (script host arenapex.cloud). The package was still live on npm (latest 1.6.2) with no OSV record as of 2026-10-16. Independently confirmed by static inspection of the live 1.6.2 npm tarball (sha256 7ca5e3908dd8721d0cf6af2488f0825c0d91a5e0b7c8529ef830141a4a3ba31f) on 2026-10-16, without execution: the bin launcher apex.cjs (sha256 4029192a44ee738deba9aa53b57550075cb8fd170a63f0636dea5452256f2175) runs when the user invokes the CLI (no install script). On Windows it sets the current user's PowerShell execution policy to RemoteSigned (no elevation needed), and on Windows 11 it launches a hidden, elevated (UAC RunAs) PowerShell that attempts to add a Defender exclusion for ~/.apex and to set HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Policy VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState=0 (disabling Smart App Control). From 1.5.122 (2026-09-17) through 1.6.2 those two commands are built in a JavaScript template literal with single backslashes, so the shipped paths are mangled (the exclusion lands on a sibling path '<home>.apex' and the registry key is invalid) and both likely fail; the UAC prompt still appears. Versions 1.5.120 (registry change) and 1.5.121 (adds the Defender exclusion), both 2026-09-17, carried correctly escaped versions of these commands without an elevation prompt, effective only when already running as administrator. The execution-policy change first appears in 1.6.2. It then downloads a ~114MB native binary from GitHub releases of apexaccs/copilot into ~/.apex/bin, and on macOS an additional apex-verify-darwin helper. Both GitHub repositories referenced by the package versions (apexaccs/copilot, Apex-Accelerator/apexcli) return 404 as of 2026-10-16. All versions affected. Indicators from Elastic's report.

Malicious versions

all versions

Every published version of this package is considered malicious — remove it entirely.

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @apexacc/cli (all published versions).
If you installed it — respond
@apexacc/cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @apexacc/cli was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @apexacc/cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (all published versions flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

References

Credits

Elastic Security Labs (Jia Yu Chan, Daniel Stepanic) · finder
Patrick Duggan, DugganUSA · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @apexacc/cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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