@aonunited/angularnpm
Malicious code in @aonunited/angular (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's preinstall script (preinstall.js) collects the installer's hostname, OS username, current working directory, and a timestamp, then sends them to two attacker-style out-of-band endpoints: a DNS lookup of a subdomain under oast.fun (an Interactsh-style callback service) constructed from the installer's identifiers, and an HTTPS POST of a JSON payload to a webhook.site URL. The package itself provides no functionality — it is a high-version (99.0.1) namespace-confusion lure against an internal @aonunited/angular package, designed so that any environment whose resolver picks the public registry copy will auto-execute the beacon. Although the metadata describes this as authorized HackerOne VDP research, the package is published to the public npm registry, so any developer or build system that installs or mistypes it leaks host fingerprints to third-party infrastructure without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@aonunited/angular' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @aonunited/angular (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @aonunited/angular across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@aonunited/angular establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @aonunited/angular was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @aonunited/angular before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @aonunited/angular-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.