Which versions of @antv/l7plot are malicious?

The following npm versions of @antv/l7plot are flagged malicious: 0.6.11, 0.7.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @antv/l7plot if I installed it?

@antv/l7plot is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @antv/l7plot — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @antv/l7plot was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @antv/l7plot part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @antv/l7plot is associated with the GHSA-qh36-m6j3-2qqj campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @antv/l7plot across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @antv/l7plot (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @antv/l7plot across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@antv/l7plotnpm

Malicious code in @antv/l7plot (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4054

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @antv/l7plot

What this malware does

Part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign in which a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script, using the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. Credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742). Stolen data includes AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Malicious versions also establish persistence via CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.

This specific package (@antv/l7plot) was modified to include a malicious preinstall hook executing the obfuscated Bun payload.

The package @antv/l7plot was found to contain malicious code.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

This package was compromised as part of the ongoing "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.

The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.6.110.7.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

847ef6b381d410bf176f7414a6f0fbbcf46a5f39b6d9011e126b279bd2d781df

4f1bb8b2fb7998dd6db0f4a864d936e3497203924426279b1ea4353c6bcd2c8f

e934fdd2b07e5414cd7d3d9b6fc7fe18e809a067e13be32be9722cac0a6519c2

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @antv/l7plot (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @antv/l7plot across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@antv/l7plot is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @antv/l7plot was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @antv/l7plot before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @antv/l7plot on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.6.11, 0.7.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-qh36-m6j3-2qqj

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @antv/l7plot-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring