@antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderernpm
Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign in which a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script, using the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. Credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742). Stolen data includes AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Malicious versions also establish persistence via CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.
This specific package (@antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer) was modified to include a malicious preinstall hook executing the obfuscated Bun payload.
The package @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer was found to contain malicious code.
This package was compromised as part of the ongoing "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.
The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.