Which versions of @antoncarlos1/nodelamp are malicious?

The following npm versions of @antoncarlos1/nodelamp are flagged malicious: 1.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @antoncarlos1/nodelamp if I installed it?

Remove @antoncarlos1/nodelamp from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed @antoncarlos1/nodelamp — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @antoncarlos1/nodelamp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @antoncarlos1/nodelamp part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @antoncarlos1/nodelamp is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007074 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @antoncarlos1/nodelamp across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @antoncarlos1/nodelamp (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @antoncarlos1/nodelamp across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@antoncarlos1/nodelampnpm

Malicious code in @antoncarlos1/nodelamp (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6209

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @antoncarlos1/nodelamp

What this malware does

@antoncarlos1/[email protected] ships a single obfuscated index.js that runs a dropper on require(). The top-level IIFE constructs a hardcoded IPv4 URL by concatenating four numeric literals with '.', issues an HTTPS GET to that bare-IP host, writes the response body to a file under os.tmpdir() with flag 'w+', and immediately spawns it with cwd=os.tmpdir() and windowsHide:true. The module is encoded with obfuscator.io (224-entry RC4 string array, two decoder functions, shuffled control flow) — the only purpose of which is to hide the destination address and the exec edge from reviewers. The package metadata advertises only 'manage the node' with no functionality justifying any network fetch or binary execution, and the package scope (@antoncarlos1) does not match the linked repository owner (guilderguzman). The fetched bytes are unpinned, unverified, and attacker-controlled; any consumer that requires this package (directly or transitively) executes them with the installer's privileges.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d930df8b6392b3bbfe3b591d90226374d31fb246e06018521f3f673a815b618a

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @antoncarlos1/nodelamp (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @antoncarlos1/nodelamp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @antoncarlos1/nodelamp from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @antoncarlos1/nodelamp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @antoncarlos1/nodelamp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @antoncarlos1/nodelamp on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007074

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @antoncarlos1/nodelamp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring