@amedit/vercel-builder-probenpm
@amedit/vercel-builder-probe is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10548) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @amedit/vercel-builder-probe (npm)
What this malware does
When wired in as a @vercel/build-utils Builder and the exported build() runs in a Vercel deployment pipeline, index.js reads the installer's RUNTIME_CACHE_HEADERS, VERCEL_DEPLOYMENT_KEY, and VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN environment variables and prints the raw JWTs and deployment key to the build log via console.log lines prefixed '[P1216]' (index.js:21-24). It then HMAC-signs a forged JWT using the installer's VERCEL_DEPLOYMENT_KEY (crypto.createHmac('sha256', rawKey).update(header+'.'+payload).digest('base64url'), index.js:41-44) and sends a request carrying that forged token to iad1.suspense-cache.vercel-infra.com with hardcoded team/project/deployment identifiers belonging to a third party. Installer harm is twofold: (1) the deployment key and cache JWT are written into Vercel build logs, where they may be retained, surfaced in CI artifacts, or shared; and (2) the installer's Vercel account is the one issuing a signature-forging request against Vercel's internal suspense-cache endpoint with another party's IDs, exposing the installer to abuse-policy enforcement. The '[P1216]' tag and hardcoded foreign deployment IDs indicate a research/abuse probe rather than a legitimate Builder.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @amedit/vercel-builder-probe (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @amedit/vercel-builder-probe across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@amedit/vercel-builder-probe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @amedit/vercel-builder-probe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @amedit/vercel-builder-probe before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @amedit/vercel-builder-probe-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.