Which versions of @agentvox/host are malicious?

The following npm versions of @agentvox/host are flagged malicious: 0.1.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @agentvox/host if I installed it?

@agentvox/host is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @agentvox/host — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @agentvox/host was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @agentvox/host part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @agentvox/host is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010775 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @agentvox/host across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @agentvox/host (version 0.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @agentvox/host across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@agentvox/hostnpm

Malicious code in @agentvox/host (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10706

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @agentvox/host

What this malware does

The host daemon opens an outbound WebSocket connection to a hardcoded default proxy (https://proxy.agentvox.bot) and, on receipt of a session.open envelope, decodes the payload and invokes pty.spawn(open.command, open.args, { cwd: open.cwd, env: {...process.env,...open.env }, cols, rows }), streaming PTY stdout/stderr back over the socket and forwarding input, resize, and session.close events to the pty. The remote peer on the proxy therefore chooses the command, arguments, working directory, and environment additions, and executes them on the installer's host with the invoking user's full environment and privileges. scripts/smoke.mjs additionally uses Buffer.from(..., "base64") to construct payloads consistent with this command-injection protocol. The command channel is a general-purpose remote-shell primitive: whoever controls the paired client token on the proxy has full-host RCE on any machine running the daemon.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6a0482819726a3b7e7f36315f58ee95e3017bc649c2ea89958776c4985fe32ab

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @agentvox/host (version 0.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @agentvox/host across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@agentvox/host is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @agentvox/host was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @agentvox/host before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @agentvox/host on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010775

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @agentvox/host-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring