@adobesign/as-dev-toolsnpm
Malicious code in @adobesign/as-dev-tools (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle hook that pipes the output of whoami through curl to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (o5u9v30a13fddwo3ey623df59wfn3er3.oastify.com). This fires automatically on npm install, leaking the installer's OS username to an attacker-controlled out-of-band callback host. The package is otherwise empty of legitimate content. The combination of the @adobesign scope, an implausible 99.9.9 version, and an out-of-band beacon is the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape: the public package is designed to be resolved in place of an internal Adobe Sign package of the same name, and any build that resolves it will beacon the installer's identity to the attacker.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@adobesign/as-dev-tools' @ 99.9.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @adobesign/as-dev-tools (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @adobesign/as-dev-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@adobesign/as-dev-tools establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @adobesign/as-dev-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @adobesign/as-dev-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @adobesign/as-dev-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.