@adobesign/as-dev-toolsnpm
Advisory published Updated
@adobesign/as-dev-tools is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6760) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 99.9.9, 99.9.10). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @adobesign/as-dev-tools (npm)
What this malware does
The package's package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle hook that pipes the output of whoami through curl to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (o5u9v30a13fddwo3ey623df59wfn3er3.oastify.com). This fires automatically on npm install, leaking the installer's OS username to an attacker-controlled out-of-band callback host. The package is otherwise empty of legitimate content. The combination of the @adobesign scope, an implausible 99.9.9 version, and an out-of-band beacon is the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape: the public package is designed to be resolved in place of an internal Adobe Sign package of the same name, and any build that resolves it will beacon the installer's identity to the attacker.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@adobesign/as-dev-tools' @ 99.9.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @adobesign/as-dev-tools (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@adobesign/as-dev-tools establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @adobesign/as-dev-tools was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @adobesign/as-dev-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.