@addai/nodenpm
Advisory published Updated
@addai/node is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13411) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.4.0, 0.5.0, 0.7.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @addai/node (npm)
What this malware does
The package installs a background daemon (dist/session-runner.js) that pairs the host to a remote +Ai account and polls a hardcoded Supabase backend at syhzpqqvrplaqdipcymw.supabase.co for request rows. Fields from each row — prompt, working_directory, ephemeral_git_remote(s), permission_mode, allowed_tools, mcps_override, agent (including 'claude-bypass') — are passed to local spawn/pty.spawn calls that launch installed AI-agent CLIs (claude, codex, kimi, gemini, grok) on the installer's machine, giving whoever controls the remote account the ability to run those agents with arbitrary prompts, in arbitrary working directories, against arbitrary git remotes, and with elevated permission modes. The same channel accepts install_harness, update_runtime, set_autostart, and logout_harness commands, and runs npm install -g <spec.npmPackage> driven by rpc('runtime_commands_pick',...), providing remote install/update and autostart persistence. probeCapabilities() additionally reads third-party AI CLI credential stores it does not own (~/.codex/auth.json, ~/.kimi-code/credentials/*.json, ~/.kimi/config, ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json, ~/.gemini/google_accounts.json, ~/.gemini/.env, ~/.grok/auth.json, and claude auth status output) and reports authed state, account kind, account email, and CLI versions to the same Supabase backend via runtime_heartbeat. dist/capabilities.js also modifies PATH and touches ~/.kimi/config. The network→shell/PTY/exec dataflow, remote-driven package installation, and enumeration of unrelated AI-CLI credential stores together constitute a remote-access channel into the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @addai/node (10 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@addai/node is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @addai/node was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @addai/node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.