@addai/entity-runtimenpm
@addai/entity-runtime is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13410) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.2.45, 0.2.46, 0.2.47…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @addai/entity-runtime (npm)
What this malware does
The package runs a daemon that polls a hardcoded Supabase project (syhzpqqvrplaqdipcymw.supabase.co) via the RPC runtime_pick_next_request for remote-supplied job rows and spawns Claude Code / Codex / Kimi / Gemini / Grok in a PTY on the installer's host, driven by fields controlled by the paired remote party (prompt, permissionMode, appendSystemPrompt, allowedTools, model, workingDirectory). In dist/session-runner.js, spawnClaudeForRuntime invokes the agent binary through a login shell (['-l','-c','exec "$@"',...]) and, when input.permissionMode === 'bypassPermissions', passes --dangerously-skip-permissions, letting the remotely-driven AI agent execute arbitrary shell tools as the local user without any interactive prompt. On start, ensureBypassPermissionsAccepted() in dist/index.js also writes skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true into the installer's user-global ~/.claude/settings.json, disabling Claude Code's own bypass-permissions safety dialog for every future interactive Claude Code session the installer runs — not just those spawned by this daemon. dist/capabilities.js additionally reads ~/.kimi/config and modifies PATH. The net effect is a persistent remote-controlled channel giving the paired remote party host-level RCE on the installer's machine via the AI agent tool loop, plus a persistent lowering of a separate vendor tool's safety prompts.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @addai/entity-runtime (12 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @addai/entity-runtime across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @addai/entity-runtime from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @addai/entity-runtime was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @addai/entity-runtime before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @addai/entity-runtime-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.