@activepieces/piece-google-formsnpm
@activepieces/piece-google-forms is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13396) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.5.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @activepieces/piece-google-forms (npm)
What this malware does
The published tarball for @activepieces/piece-google-forms 0.5.7 contains src/index.js which imports child_process, invokes ping-style OS command execution (line 38), and issues hardcoded HTTP POST requests (lines 25, 38). This co-occurrence — child_process command execution combined with network POST to a hardcoded destination inside a piece module that is loaded when the Activepieces host requires it — matches the shape of an installer-side command-execution and data-exfiltration payload rather than the ordinary Google Forms API integration the package advertises. A legitimate Google Forms piece would call the Google Forms REST API via the piece framework's HTTP helpers; it would not shell out or ping remote hosts. The package's name and scope also resemble the legitimate @activepieces/* piece ecosystem, which increases the likelihood that the release is a lookalike or a compromised publish rather than a benign integration.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @activepieces/piece-google-forms (version 0.5.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @activepieces/piece-google-forms across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@activepieces/piece-google-forms is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @activepieces/piece-google-forms was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @activepieces/piece-google-forms before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @activepieces/piece-google-forms-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.