@achuthvp/postinstall-pocnpm
Malicious code in @achuthvp/postinstall-poc (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js. On every npm install, postinstall.js runs execSync('id') and POSTs a JSON body containing the id output, os.hostname(), platform, architecture, process.cwd(), and Node version to the hardcoded URL https://webhook.site/fceebb0d-9f11-4ac0-98db-6f6b3925f7d3 (postinstall.js line 14, exfil call constructed via https.request at line 21 with POST at line 24). The behavior is unconditional, undisclosed in the README (Does nothing much), and fires on a default install. Although the package self-describes as a POC, the install-time mechanism is identical to an active reconnaissance/exfiltration payload: any developer or CI machine installing this package leaks its identity (uid/gid/groups via id, hostname, cwd, platform) to an attacker-readable webhook bin.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @achuthvp/postinstall-poc (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @achuthvp/postinstall-poc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@achuthvp/postinstall-poc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @achuthvp/postinstall-poc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @achuthvp/postinstall-poc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @achuthvp/postinstall-poc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.