@accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-corenpm
Advisory published Updated
@accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17867) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 99.99.2, 99.99.4, 99.99.41…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core (npm)
What this malware does
@accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core describes itself as “A simple placeholder for npm.” Its preinstall hook runs node index.js || true on npm install. Version 99.99.2 encodes the hostname and username as hexadecimal query parameters and sends them to accenture-npm.azurewebsites.net/test; version 99.99.4 sends a GET request to https://accenture-npm.azurewebsites.net/async; and version 99.99.41 sends a GET request to https://accenture-npm.azurewebsites.net/mfe. The npm account priyashareek published it on 2026-10-13.
The package belongs to a dependency confusion campaign by priyashareek against the internal scopes @accenturecodefoundry and @newspage. @newspage/libx-amount and @newspage/lib-ng-async-routes-ui from the same publisher call back to the same host. The publisher used 99.99.x versions to outrank the internal packages; 0.0.0-stage and 99.99.1 are empty placeholders. Each beacon reveals the victim's egress IP and tells the operator the dependency confusion worked.
The package uses the @accenturecodefoundry scope with version 99.99.43 and the description 'A simple placeholder for npm.', consistent with a public squat targeting an internal Accenture-scoped package during dependency resolution. package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js. On install, index.js reads HOSTNAME/COMPUTERNAME and USER/USERNAME from the environment, hex-encodes the concatenation, and issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded endpoint at accenture-npm.azurewebsites.net with the encoded identifiers in a query parameter. The destination is not a first-party Accenture domain and the behavior is undocumented. The combination of internal-scope impersonation, implausibly high version intended to win resolution against a private package, placeholder content, and an install-time beacon of host identity to an external endpoint is the dependency-confusion reconnaissance pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core (4 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- InvisiRisk, Inc. · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @accenturecodefoundry/mfe-pot-shared-ui-scds-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.