@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegennpm
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15494) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be, 0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab, 0.5.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen (npm)
What this malware does
The tarball ships a binding.gyp at the package root whose conditions field abuses GYP's Python expression evaluator to walk ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() to catch_warnings, retrieve __import__ via _module.__builtins__, load os, and call os.system('node 3FWCvzduYZg.js') (the command is Unicode-escape-obfuscated). Because a binding.gyp at the package root causes npm install to invoke node-gyp rebuild automatically — even with no lifecycle script declared — this executes shell on every installer during configure. The launched sibling file 3FWCvzduYZg.js is a 5.4 MB blob consisting of a single try{Function(function(a,k){...XOR...}([large int array], key))(...)} construct: an XOR-decoded string passed to Function() and invoked, a loader/dropper shape whose body cannot be inspected without evaluation. The referenced native source (dog.c) is absent from the tarball, so the binding.gyp has no legitimate build purpose. package.json declares "files": ["dist"], but binding.gyp and 3FWCvzduYZg.js sit at the tarball root and are honored regardless — an inclusion gap consistent with smuggled payload added outside the declared publish surface. The package's advertised purpose is a React Query code generator, which requires no native addon and no multi-megabyte obfuscated JS payload.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen (10 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.