@43uh3ig43/telemetry-clientnpm
Malicious code in @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's preinstall, install, and postinstall lifecycle hooks all invoke telemetry.js, which collects host metadata (OS, architecture, Node version, pid) and CI-provider identification (probing GITHUB_ACTIONS, AZURE_DEVOPS, JENKINS_HOME environment variables), hex-encodes the JSON payload, and exfiltrates it via DNS lookups to subdomains of d87vcrdfokaufbs0qf903rg6tp9to7jpe.oast.pro — a Project Discovery interactsh out-of-band server. The exfil destination is split-string concatenated at telemetry.js:15 ("d87vcrdfokaufbs0"+"qf903rg6tp9to7jpe"+"."+"oa"+"st"+"."+"pro") specifically to evade naive static grep. The package's user-facing index.js is a stub that only logs a string; the real behavior is the install-time beacon. Combined with the random-looking scope, anomalously high version (99.0.1), and UNLICENSED metadata, this is the canonical fingerprint of a dependency-confusion / supply-chain recon probe — designed to trigger from corporate build systems whose internal package names collide with this scope and to phone home with enough host context to identify the victim organization.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@43uh3ig43/telemetry-client' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client (version 99.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@43uh3ig43/telemetry-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @43uh3ig43/telemetry-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.