@0xlr/prisma-client-jsnpm
Malicious code in @0xlr/prisma-client-js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js enumerates all of process.env, collects hostname, username, homedir, cwd, argv, platform/arch/release, memory and CPU info, and POSTs the resulting JSON blob over HTTPS to the hardcoded attacker-controlled domain rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band exfiltration host). The package name @0xlr/prisma-client-js impersonates the legitimate prisma-client-js / @prisma/client packages, and the 999.0.0 version is the canonical dependency-confusion override pattern; the package.json description self-identifies as a 'Placeholder reservation' for that namespace. Any installer running npm install against this package leaks the full process environment — including AWS_, NPM_TOKEN, GH_, CI/CD secrets — plus host identifiers to the attacker.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @0xlr/prisma-client-js (version 999.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @0xlr/prisma-client-js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@0xlr/prisma-client-js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @0xlr/prisma-client-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @0xlr/prisma-client-js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @0xlr/prisma-client-js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.