logs-updatecrates.io
logs-update is a confirmed malicious crates.io package (MAL-2026-16164) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data. Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in logs_update (crates.io)
What this malware does
logs-update is a malicious crate published to crates.io on 2026-09-10 with zero downloads. It pretends to be a terminal progress-bar library, but renders nothing to a terminal. The whole crate steals files and sets up remote access.
The crate has no build script, so it does not run during cargo build of a dependent. It runs when someone runs its binary (for example after cargo install logs-update) or when a dependent calls its run() function.
When it runs, it does four things:
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It POSTs a machine fingerprint (username, OS, and local IP) to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/system-info.
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It reads the project's .env and its trading-bot config files and POSTs them to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/project-env.
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It walks the filesystem and POSTs the contents of .env, .json, .txt, .doc, .docx, and .xlsx files to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/files.
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On Linux, it appends an attacker's SSH public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, giving the attacker remote login as that user.
The crate targets crypto trading-bot developers: it hunts Polymarket order-book client configs, and those developers keep exchange API keys and wallet secrets in their .env files. Every version is malicious.
Attacker SSH public key appended to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (comment [email protected]): ssh-rsa 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 [email protected]
Malicious versions
Every published version of this package is considered malicious — remove it entirely.
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for logs-update (all published versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging logs-update across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
logs-update is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If logs-update was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks logs-update before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks logs-update-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.