{"id":"GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7","summary":"block_buffer: panic corrupts inline buffer position","details":"### Summary\n\nA caught panic may leave the cursor position of `EagerBuffer` or `ReadBuffer` in a corrupted state; this in turn allows out-of-bounds reads/writes.\n\n### Details & PoC\n\nThe following two tests fail miri:\n\n```rust\n#[cfg(miri)]\n#[test]\nfn eager_digest_blocks_panic_corrupts_inline_position() {\n    // `EagerBuffer` stores its cursor in the last byte of the internal block.\n    // When `digest_blocks` completes a previously partial block, it overwrites\n    // that byte with input data before invoking the caller-provided `compress`\n    // callback. If the callback panics, safe code can catch the panic and keep\n    // using the buffer while its cursor byte no longer satisfies the internal\n    // `pos < block_size` invariant. Under Miri this `get_pos` call reaches the\n    // `unreachable_unchecked` used for the assumed-valid cursor.\n    let mut buf = EagerBuffer::<U4>::new(&[1, 2]);\n\n    let _ = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {\n        buf.digest_blocks(&[3, 0xff], |_| panic!(\"simulated compression failure\"));\n    }));\n\n    let _ = buf.get_pos();\n}\n\n#[cfg(miri)]\n#[test]\nfn read_buffer_generator_panic_corrupts_inline_position() {\n    // `ReadBuffer` stores its cursor in `buffer[0]`, but `write_block` gives\n    // `gen_block` mutable access to the whole internal block before restoring\n    // `buffer[0]` to a valid cursor. If `gen_block` writes an arbitrary first\n    // byte and panics, safe code can catch the panic and later observe an\n    // invalid cursor. Under Miri this `get_pos` call reaches the\n    // `unreachable_unchecked` used for the assumed-valid cursor.\n    let mut buf = ReadBuffer::<U4>::default();\n\n    let _ = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {\n        buf.write_block(\n            1,\n            |block| {\n                block[0] = 0xff;\n                panic!(\"simulated block generation failure\");\n            },\n            |_| {},\n        );\n    }));\n\n    let _ = buf.get_pos();\n}\n```\n\nThey fail on an `unreachable_unchecked!()` under the invariant for the `pos` to always be within bounds of the block.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhile the byte that overwrites `pos` may come from untrusted input and is therefore attacker-controlled, this still relies on the surrounding code catching the panic and carrying on, which should be uncommon in practice.\n\nFor this to be exploitable, the attacker also needs a way to trigger a panic here; I have not investigated how feasible that is.\n\n### Credits\n\nThe issue was discovered by GPT-5.5","published":"2026-08-19T19:15:34Z","modified":"2026-08-19T19:30:06.686866977Z","cvss":null,"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"block_buffer","fixedVersion":"0.12.1"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/utils/security/advisories/GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/utils"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/utils/releases/tag/block-buffer-v0.12.1"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-19T19:30:06.686866977Z"}}