{"id":"GHSA-p4h8-56qp-hpgv","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/GHSA-p4h8-56qp-hpgv","summary":"SSH/SCP option injection allowing local RCE in @aiondadotcom/mcp-ssh","details":"## Impact\n\nA crafted `hostAlias` argument such as `-oProxyCommand=...` was passed to `ssh`/`scp` without an argument terminator. SSH interprets arguments starting with `-` as options regardless of position, so the option-injection caused SSH to execute the attacker-supplied `ProxyCommand` **locally** on the machine running the MCP server — before any network connection. This bypassed the documented protection of `# @password:` annotations and exposed local SSH keys, browser cookies, other MCP server credentials, and anything else readable by the server process.\n\nA second local-RCE vector existed on Windows: `spawn(..., { shell: true })` was used so that `ssh.exe`/`scp.exe` could be found via `PATH`. With `shell: true`, every argument is re-parsed by `cmd.exe`, so shell metacharacters (`&`, `|`, `^`, `>`, `\"`, `;`, …) in `hostAlias`, `command`, `localPath` or `remotePath` would have been interpreted by `cmd.exe` and could have triggered arbitrary local command execution on Windows.\n\nThe MCP server runs locally over STDIO, but the LLM driving it is not trusted: its tool arguments can be steered by **prompt injection** from any untrusted text the LLM ingests (web pages, e-mails, repository files, output of other MCP servers). The attack does not require a malicious user — only that the LLM ingests attacker-controlled text at any point during the session.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.3.5**.\n\n- Add `--` argument terminator to all `ssh`/`scp` invocations.\n- Strict whitelist for `hostAlias` (rejects leading `-` and shell metacharacters).\n- Known-host check: every `hostAlias` must be defined in `~/.ssh/config` (including `Include` directives) or present in `~/.ssh/known_hosts`.\n- Resolve `ssh.exe`/`scp.exe` to absolute paths and use `shell: false` everywhere on Windows.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to 1.3.5.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Pico (@piiiico) as part of an MCP server security audit.","published":"2026-04-14T00:04:10Z","modified":"2026-04-14T00:28:04.463444Z","cvss":null,"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@aiondadotcom/mcp-ssh","fixedVersion":"1.3.5"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-p4h8-56qp-hpgv"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/issues/9"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/releases/tag/1.3.5"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-04-14T00:28:04.463444Z"}}