{"id":"GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754","summary":"PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle","details":"### Impact\n\n`RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).\n\nFrom a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nApplications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key.\n\n### Patches\n\nPKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to `RSA-OAEP`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nPrefer `RSA-OAEP`/`RSA-OAEP-256`; do not enable `RSA1_5` for untrusted tokens.\n\n### References\n\n- RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2\n- Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack\n- CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy\n\n## Résolution\n\nUn correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur `3.4.x`, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).\n\n**RSA1_5** — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec *implicit rejection* en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher.\n\n**Validation :** `php -l` OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs `3.4.x`), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue `3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x`.","published":"2026-06-18T21:09:56Z","modified":"2026-08-31T15:00:08.858887291Z","cvss":null,"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"web-token/jwt-library","fixedVersion":"3.4.10"},{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"web-token/jwt-library","fixedVersion":"4.0.7"},{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"web-token/jwt-library","fixedVersion":"4.1.7"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/web-token/jwt-library/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754.yaml"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-31T15:00:08.858887291Z"}}