{"id":"CVE-2026-77283","aliases":["GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-77283","summary":"obsidian-sync-mcp: Missing Host/Origin validation lets a public website drive a victim's Obsidian vault via DNS rebinding (no-auth mode)","details":"When obsidian-sync-mcp runs without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (the documented no-auth mode for local use), the HTTP MCP endpoint does not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods (CWE-350). The no-auth mode's \"local network only\" assumption therefore does not hold: a malicious web page the operator visits can use DNS rebinding to resolve an attacker-controlled hostname to 127.0.0.1 (or the operator's LAN/VPN/Docker-published address) and issue requests the server accepts as trusted local calls, reaching the full tool surface (read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags, get_note_metadata).\n\nAffected versions: <= 0.5.6\nPatched version: 0.5.7\n\n## Impact\n\nAny deployment running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN — including the README \"Filesystem mode (simplest)\" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup (where MCP_AUTH_TOKEN defaults to empty)\" — is exposed to any website the operator visits while the server is running. That page's JavaScript can silently read the entire vault and create/overwrite/delete/move notes, with no credentials and no prompt. In CouchDB/Self-hosted LiveSync mode, the same code path applies, so vault content in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected — a bearer token is not attached by browsers, so a forged request returns HTTP 401.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to 0.5.7, which validates both the Host and Origin headers in no-auth mode: any request whose Host is not localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 (or a value in the new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS), or that carries a cross-origin Origin not in that allowlist, is rejected before any MCP method runs. The Host check defeats DNS rebinding; the Origin check defeats the related bypass where a page directly fetches http://127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp (genuine loopback Host, attacker Origin) — the transport's wildcard CORS would otherwise expose the response. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin, so they are unaffected. These checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a direct non-browser network client can still forge both headers, so on untrusted networks set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN.\n\nWorkaround (any version): set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN to require authentication — this closes the path immediately.\n\n## Technical detail\n\nIn no-auth mode serverOptions.authenticate was never installed, so FastMCP dispatched every request with no per-request check. Even with a token, only the Authorization header was inspected — nothing in the server, fastmcp, or mcp-proxy validated Host/Origin. Two browser-reachable variants follow: (1) classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker's hostname in Host; and (2) a direct cross-origin fetch() to the loopback address, where Host is genuinely 127.0.0.1 but Origin is attacker-controlled and the transport's wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * exposes the response — no rebinding required. The 0.5.7 fix adds an application-layer Host+Origin check in authenticate that rejects such requests before dispatch; it is a compensating control and does not alter the wildcard CORS header itself (the rejection happens before any response body is produced).\n\n## Proof of concept (mitigated in 0.5.7)\n```\n# No-auth server (per the README quickstart)\nVAULT_PATH=/tmp/demo-vault HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 npx tsx src/main.ts\n\n# Forged Host/Origin (what a DNS-rebinding page's fetch() sends) reaches the tools with no credential:\ncurl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \\\n  -H \"Host: attacker.example\" -H \"Origin: http://attacker.example\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\" \\\n  -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1.0\"}}}'\n# -> HTTP 200; a follow-up tools/call to write_note creates a file in the vault, no Authorization header.\n# The same sequence against a server with MCP_AUTH_TOKEN set returns HTTP 401.\n```\n\n```\n# Variant 2 — no rebinding needed: real loopback Host, attacker Origin.\n# In <= 0.5.6 this returns 200 and executes tools; in 0.5.7 it returns 403.\ncurl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \\\n  -H \"Host: 127.0.0.1:8787\" -H \"Origin: http://attacker.example\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\" \\\n  -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1.0\"}}}'\n```","published":"2026-11-18T22:54:15.468Z","modified":"2026-11-19T21:01:52.109180519Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00375,"percentile":0.32168,"asOf":"2026-11-19"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"obsidian-sync-mcp","fixedVersion":"0.5.7"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/commit/d4d2cbbb02ffadaecf1d6252902b8d08610c7018","label":"es617/obsidian-sync-mcp@d4d2cbb"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/releases/tag/v0.5.7"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/77xxx/CVE-2026-77283.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77283"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/commit/d4d2cbbb02ffadaecf1d6252902b8d08610c7018"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T21:01:52.109180519Z"}}