# CVE-2026-73424: @astrojs/vercel — Fixed in 11.0.3

📦

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

MEDIUM severity

# CVE-2026-73424 — @astrojs/vercel

MEDIUM [Fix: withastro/astro@3a43cf0](https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/3a43cf0f3690a8e33cb30109bc5165611cf38fcd)

CVE-2026-73424 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-441 vulnerability in @astrojs/vercel. A fix is available for @astrojs/vercel — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Astro: Unauthenticated path override in the @astrojs/vercel ISR function

Also known as[GHSA-x27w-589x-frm2](/vulnerability/GHSA-x27w-589x-frm2)

Published

Aug 17, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

## Exploitation Status

### Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

-   CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
-   CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73424.

## EPSS Exploitation Probability

[via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/)

0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs33th percentile — riskier than 33% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

0.00%0.29%0.59%0.88%0.2%0.4%0.4%0.4%Sep 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/).

## How urgent is this, really

## Where this sits among everything scored

## Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

33other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

`@astrojs/vercel`npm

774Kdownloads / week

## Description

### Summary

When ISR is enabled, the serverless entrypoint lets an unauthenticated request decide which route the origin renders. The internal `_isr` function reads the `x_astro_path` query parameter and rewrites the request path to it without any authentication. Edge level access controls only ever see the `/_isr` path, so they do not apply to the route that actually gets rendered. This is the same confused deputy problem as CVE-2026-33768, reachable again through the ISR path.

### Impact

This affects apps that use `@astrojs/vercel` with `isr: true` and protect routes at the edge. Two common setups are affected:

1.  Path rules or firewall deny rules configured on Vercel (for example blocking `/admin`).
2.  Split deployments (`edgeMiddleware: true`) where authorization lives in Astro middleware, since that middleware runs at the edge and not in the origin.

An attacker reads any GET rendered route by requesting `/_isr?x_astro_path=/the/protected/path`. No credentials are required. The protected content is produced by a fresh origin render, so the attack does not depend on the response being cached first.

### Details

`packages/integrations/vercel/src/serverless/entrypoint.ts` picks the real path like this:

```
if (hasValidMiddlewareSecret) {
  realPath = request.headers.get(ASTRO_PATH_HEADER);       // secret checked
} else if (request.headers.get('x-vercel-isr') === '1') {
  realPath = url.searchParams.get(ASTRO_PATH_PARAM);        // no secret checked
}
```

The header path is gated by the per build secret and is fine. The ISR branch is not. Two facts make it reachable by anyone:

1.  The `_isr` function is publicly addressable.
2.  Vercel sets `x-vercel-isr: 1` on requests to it, including direct external requests, so the attacker does not even need to send that header.

So `GET /_isr?x_astro_path=/admin` sets the internal path to `/admin` and renders it. The edge saw only `/_isr`, which is allowed, so any path based rule on `/admin` never fires. In split deployments the edge middleware also runs against `/_isr`, and the origin does not run middleware at all, so middleware based auth is skipped as well.

### How this regressed

CVE-2026-33768 was fixed in 10.0.2 by commit 335a204161 (PR #15959), which required the secret for every path override and removed the query parameter source. Commit aa266364fe (PR #16079, "Fix ISR path rewrite to prevent 404") brought the query parameter back, guarded only by the `x-vercel-isr` header. That header is not a security boundary, so the fix was effectively undone for ISR routes starting in 10.0.3.

Worth noting the contrast: the original report treated Edge Middleware as the mitigation and scoped the issue to deployments without it. Here, for split deployments, Edge Middleware is bypassed too, since the attacker reaches `/_isr` directly and the middleware only sees `/_isr` while the origin runs none.

### Proof of concept

1.  Create an Astro app with `output: 'server'` and adapter `vercel({ isr: true })`.
2.  Add a page at `/admin` that returns sensitive content.
3.  Deny `/admin` at the edge, for example a Vercel path rule that returns 403, or a middleware auth check in a split (`edgeMiddleware: true`) build.
4.  Request `/admin`. It is blocked (403).
5.  Request `/_isr?x_astro_path=/admin`. It returns 200 with the admin content. The response header `X-Vercel-Cache: MISS` confirms it was rendered fresh, not served from an existing cache entry.

### What is not affected

1.  Classic (non split) middleware. It runs inside the origin against the rewritten path, so it still applies to the target route.
2.  State changing requests. Vercel serves ISR functions for GET only, and returns 403 for POST, PUT and DELETE, so the method preserving variant of CVE-2026-33768 does not reproduce here. Impact is limited to reading (confidentiality).
3.  Whole deployment protection (Vercel SSO or password), which also covers `/_isr`.

### Severity

Unauthenticated read of any GET rendered route that is protected only at the edge. No integrity or availability impact because the vector is GET only.

### Suggested fix

One option would be to require the secret again for path overrides, the way PR #15959 did, so the ISR branch stops trusting the client supplied `x_astro_path`. The 404 that PR #16079 was fixing would then need another approach that does not rely on client input.

## Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem

Package

Vulnerable range

Fix

📦npm

`@astrojs/vercel` 

≥ 10.0.3&&< 11.0.3

11.0.3`npm install @astrojs/vercel@11.0.3`

## Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

1.  ### Detect
    
    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @astrojs/vercel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
    
2.  ### Fix
    
    Update @astrojs/vercel to 11.0.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73424 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
    
3.  ### Workarounds
    
    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
    

## Frequently Asked Questions

\## Summary When ISR is enabled, the serverless entrypoint lets an unauthenticated request decide which route the origin renders. The internal \`\_isr\` function reads the \`x\_astro\_path\` query parameter and rewrites the request path to it without any authentication. Edge level access controls only ever see the \`/\_isr\` path, so they do not apply to the route that actually gets rendered. This is the same confused deputy problem as CVE-2026-33768, reachable again through the ISR path. ## Impact This affects apps that use \`@astrojs/vercel\` with \`isr: true\` and protect routes at the edge. Two common s

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