{"id":"CVE-2026-63386","aliases":["GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-63386","summary":"js-toml: Uncontrolled recursion in `load()` causes `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input","details":"## Summary\n\n`load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a\nrecursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a\nmaximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting\n(arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack\nlimit, and `load()` throws an **uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`**.\n\nThis is a problem for two reasons:\n\n1. **Denial of Service.** A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any\n   service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled `RangeError` can crash the\n   worker/process (500 / restart loop).\n2. **Error-contract violation.** The library signals invalid input via\n   `SyntaxParseError` (see `src/load/exception.ts`; the entire test suite asserts\n   `SyntaxParseError`). Consumers that follow this contract —\n\n   ```js\n   try { load(input); }\n   catch (e) {\n     if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();\n     throw e; // unexpected -> propagates\n   }\n   ```\n\n   — will **re-throw** the `RangeError` instead of treating the input as malformed,\n   turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using\n  `js-toml` can force `load()` to throw a non-`SyntaxParseError` error.\n- If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates\n  (availability impact).\n- Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken,\n  which can bypass input-validation branches that key off `SyntaxParseError`.\n\nNo confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is\ncatchable, so a consumer that catches *all* exceptions is not crashed — this is why the\nseverity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.\n\n## Affected code / root cause\n\nThere is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least)\ntwo independent places:\n\n1. **Parser (recursive descent).** `src/load/parser.ts` — `array` / `inlineTable`\n   rules recurse through `value` for each nesting level.\n2. **Interpreter (tree walk).** `src/load/interpreter.ts` —\n   `assignValue`, `createTable`, `getOrCreateArray` recurse per dotted-key segment, and\n   `cleanInternalProperties` recurses per object depth.\n\nBecause there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by\nthe V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw `RangeError`.\n\n## Steps to reproduce (PoC)\n\nEnvironment used: Node.js v20, `js-toml@1.1.2`.\n\n```js\nimport { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';\n\nfunction probe(label, toml) {\n  try {\n    load(toml);\n    console.log(`[OK]            ${label}`);\n  } catch (e) {\n    const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;\n    console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\\n')[0]}`);\n  }\n}\n\n// 1) Deeply nested arrays  (~2 KB payload)\nprobe('nested array depth 1000', 'x = ' + '['.repeat(1000) + ']'.repeat(1000));\n\n// 2) Deeply nested inline tables\nlet v = '1';\nfor (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) v = `{ a = ${v} }`;\nprobe('nested inline table depth 1000', 'x = ' + v);\n\n// 3) Deep dotted key (interpreter recursion)\nconst key = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, i) => 'a' + i).join('.');\nprobe('dotted key depth 5000', `${key} = 1`);\n```\n\n### Observed output\n\n```\n[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested array depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested inline table depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] dotted key depth 5000: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nEach case throws `RangeError`, **not** `SyntaxParseError`. Overflow occurs in single-digit\nmilliseconds, so it is not a CPU-exhaustion issue — it is an immediate, deterministic abort.\n\nNotes on thresholds (machine-dependent; exact numbers vary by stack size):\n- Nested arrays / inline tables overflow at roughly **depth ~1000** (parser recursion).\n- Dotted keys overflow at roughly **depth ~5000** (interpreter recursion); depth 1000 still succeeds.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nEnforce an explicit, documented maximum nesting/key depth and surface violations as\n`SyntaxParseError` (consistent with all other invalid-input handling). For example:\n\n- Track current depth in the parser/interpreter and throw `SyntaxParseError`\n  (e.g. `\"Maximum nesting depth exceeded\"`) once a configurable limit (e.g. 100–1000)\n  is reached, **before** the native stack overflows.\n- As a defensive backstop, wrap the top-level `load()` body so that a thrown\n  `RangeError` from stack exhaustion is converted into a `SyntaxParseError`, guaranteeing\n  the documented error contract holds for all malformed input.\n\nA configurable limit (with a safe default) is preferable so legitimate deep documents can\nopt into a higher bound.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nReported privately via GitHub Security Advisory. Happy to provide additional reproducers\nor test against a candidate patch.","published":"2026-09-22T19:00:19.734Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:37.036542677Z","cvss":{"score":5.3,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"},"epss":{"score":0.00361,"percentile":0.30694,"asOf":"2026-11-20"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"js-toml","fixedVersion":"1.1.3"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/4e10acf1f99ff3cb443c58b8f0a57664e41e87c6","label":"sunnyadn/js-toml@4e10acf"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/releases/tag/v1.1.3"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63386.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63386"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/4e10acf1f99ff3cb443c58b8f0a57664e41e87c6"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-10-28T02:30:37.036542677Z"}}