{"id":"CVE-2026-59219","aliases":["GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw","PYSEC-2026-3595"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59219","summary":"Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout","details":"## Summary\n\nWith Redis configured, Open WebUI supports JWT revocation: `POST /api/v1/auths/signout` (per-token `jti`) and OIDC back-channel logout (per-user `revoked_at`) record revocations in Redis, and HTTP auth (`get_current_user`) rejects revoked tokens with 401. The realtime authentication surfaces do not perform this check: Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth validate tokens with `decode_token()` only (signature + expiry). A JWT revoked by sign-out or back-channel logout therefore continues to authenticate new realtime connections, even though the same token is rejected on HTTP.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — Socket.IO `connect`, `user-join`, `join-channels`, `join-note`\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` — terminal websocket first-message auth\n- `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py` — the revocation check was applied to HTTP only\n\n## Root cause\n\nHTTP auth enforces revocation:\n\n```python\n# utils/auth.py — get_current_user\nif data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data):\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Invalid token')\n```\n\nRealtime auth calls `decode_token()` only, which verifies signature + expiry but never consults the Redis revocation keys (`{prefix}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked`, `{prefix}:auth:user:{id}:revoked_at`):\n\n```python\n# socket/main.py — connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note\ndata = decode_token(auth['token'])\n# routers/terminals.py — _resolve_authenticated_connection\ndata = decode_token(token)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA JWT revoked by user sign-out or OIDC back-channel logout still authenticates new realtime connections. A stolen token therefore retains realtime access after the victim signs out or the IdP performs back-channel logout — the very remediation for a compromised token. The token can populate `SESSION_POOL` as the victim, join their user/channel/note rooms (receiving realtime channel messages, collaborative-note updates and presence), drive socket-level collaboration as the victim, and pass terminal websocket authentication when terminal servers are configured. HTTP remains correctly protected (401), so REST data and state-changing REST endpoints are not reachable with the revoked token.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReporter PoC on a Redis-backed deployment (v0.9.6 and main): after `POST /api/v1/auths/signout`, HTTP returns 401 for the token while a Socket.IO user-join with the same token still authenticates, and the terminal WS reaches terminal-server lookup rather than rejecting it as `Invalid token`.\n\n## Fix\n\nApply the revocation check on the realtime paths. The logic is factored into `is_token_revoked(redis, decoded)` (covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`); the Socket.IO handlers and the terminal WS reject tokens that fail it, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same helper, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.\n\n## Affected / Patched\n\n- Affected: `>= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`, and only when Redis is configured (without Redis, per-token revocation is not supported and sign-out does not invalidate JWTs by design).\n- Patched: v0.10.0. The revocation check (`is_valid_token`, covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`) is applied on Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same logic, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.","published":"2026-07-09T16:43:24.542Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:41.340547060Z","cvss":{"score":7.1,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.00456,"percentile":0.38749,"asOf":"2026-09-17"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","name":"open-webui","fixedVersion":"0.10.0"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/33b91bd8ae8a100a5a306c91441a7d0b422c4cde","label":"open-webui/open-webui@33b91bd"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59219.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59219"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/33b91bd8ae8a100a5a306c91441a7d0b422c4cde"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:41.340547060Z"}}