{"id":"CVE-2026-55153","aliases":["GHSA-h84g-69h7-mw6v"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-55153","summary":"mchange-commons-java contains elements susceptible to abuse via JNDI injection and \"deserialization gadgets\"","details":"### Impact\nPrior to version 0.6.0, mchange-commons-java includes a JNDI `ObjectFactory` implementation (`com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory`) willing to construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize \"JavaBean\"-style properties. There are classes for which this kind of initialization is unsafe. For example, setting the \"contentType\" property of a Swing `JEditorPane` to `text/html` and the \"text\" property to HTML containing a stylesheet <link> will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. This issue is aggravated by mchange-commons-java's `ReferenceIndirector`, by which malicious JNDI `Reference` objects could be smuggled in for dereferencing by applications anywhere a Java-serialized object might be read. \n\nPrior to version 0.5.0, the same mchange-commons-java `ObjectFactory` would interpret `BinaryRefAddress` elements as Java-serialized objects, and deserialize unexpected objects that potentially execute malicious behavior on initialization. Although this author is unaware of any code within mchange-commons-java itself that can be abused to execute code on deserialization, this mechanism can be used to trigger well-known \"deserialization gadget chains\" involving other libraries. For example, in JVMs prior to Java 16 with Apache libraries [`commons-beanutils`](https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-beanutils/) and [`commons-collections`](https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-collections/) on the application `CLASSPATH`, [objects can be crafted](https://gist.github.com/frohoff/9eb8811761ff989b3ac0) that will execute arbitrary commands on deserialization. (Thanks to Valerio Mulas for a proof-of-concept.)\n\n### Patches\nmchange-commons-java v0.5.0 eliminates all support for deserializing Java objects in `com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory`, unless an application explicitly extends that class to restore it. This prevents mchange-commons-java from enabling JNDI injection to trigger common \"deserialization gadgets\".\n\nmchange-commons-java v0.6.0 imposes a whitelist upon what classes `com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory` consents to materialize, preventing the use of maliciously constructed `Reference` instances to initialize arbitrary, potentially malicious, objects.\n\nmchange-commons-java v0.6.0 disables the `ReferenceIndirector` mechanism by default. This mechanism has been abused by attackers to inject dangerous JNDI `Reference` objects by causing an application to deserialize a malicious Java-serialized object. (The functionality remains for applications that need it, gated behind a restrictive configuration parameter. This is \"defense-in-depth\"; the hardening of `JavaBeanObjectFactory` on its own should be sufficient to prevent known `Reference`-based attacks. But perhaps there are other insecure `ObjectFactory` implementations on the `CLASSPATH` or vulnerabilities as-yet-unknown.)\n\n### Workarounds\nUpgrading to the current version of mchange-commons-java is strongly recommended. Most applications that install mchange-commons-java do so to support the c3p0 JDBC Connection pooling library. When upgrading mchange-commons-java, be sure to update c3p0 as well, or better yet, upgrade to c3p0 >=v0.14.0 and bring in a patched mchange-commons-java transitively.\n\nMaintaining rigorous serialization filters can prevent many attacks (but not attacks requiring only construction of a named class and initialization of simple JavaBeans properties, as described for `JEditorPane` above).\n\nThe vulnerabilities that this advisory addresses all begin with arranging for an application to lookup a malicious JNDI `Reference` or deserialize a malicious Java-serialized object. Assiduously preventing an application from ever encountering such a `Reference` or serialized object is hypothetically a workaround. But relying upon perfection is usually bad planning.\n\nThe most common known attacks rely upon JVM-internal XSLT code that has been made inaccessible on Java 16 and beyond. Running on a more recent JVM is a mitigating workaround.\n\n### Resources\nThe vulnerabilities and security upgrades are documented in c3p0's manual. Please see c3p0's [Security Note](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#security-note) and [Configuring Security](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security).\n\n### Credits\nmchange-commons-java thanks 4ra1n and unam4 on Github for a proof-of-concept.","published":"2026-07-01T20:02:47.254Z","modified":"2026-08-15T21:41:51.218685945Z","cvss":{"score":7.1,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":{"score":0.00587,"percentile":0.45413,"asOf":"2026-08-24"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","name":"com.mchange:mchange-commons-java","fixedVersion":"0.6.0"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55153.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/swaldman/mchange-commons-java/security/advisories/GHSA-h84g-69h7-mw6v"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55153"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/swaldman/mchange-commons-java"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-15T21:41:51.218685945Z"}}