{"id":"CVE-2026-54150","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54150","summary":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","details":"### Impact\n\nThe HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.\n\nThe handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between \"remote URL\" and \"local file path\" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is appended, and the file is read with `fs.readFile` and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.\n\nOn a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:\n- The **Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key** (`.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json`)\n- The **Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys** (`previewModeId`, `previewModeSigningKey`, `previewModeEncryptionKey`)\n- Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths\n- Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux `uploadId`, `assetId`, `playbackId` values stored in `videos/*.json`)\n\nAny application that mounted `/api/video` following the documented one-liner is affected.\n\n### Patches\n\n2.8.1\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUntil a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the `url` parameter before passing it through:\n\n- Reject any `url` value that does not begin with `https://`, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.\n- Alternatively, remove the `/api/video` route entirely if your application only uses build-time `import` of local video files and does not use `