{"id":"CVE-2026-48512","aliases":["GHSA-cj9g-3mj2-g8vv"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-48512","summary":"MessagePack-CSharp: JSON conversion APIs can recurse without consistent depth enforcement","details":"## Summary\n\nMessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization.\n\nThree related issues are covered by this advisory:\n\n1. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson` recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in `FromJsonCore()` without consulting `MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth`.\n2. `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character.\n3. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls `ToJsonCore()` without applying `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)`.\n\nEach path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they call MessagePack-CSharp JSON conversion APIs on attacker-controlled data. This includes gateways, diagnostics endpoints, migration tools, logging paths, and services that convert between external JSON and MessagePack payloads.\n\nFor JSON-to-MessagePack conversion, deeply nested JSON arrays or objects can recurse through `FromJsonCore()` without applying the configured object graph depth limit. Separately, long runs of comma or colon separator characters can recurse through `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` before normal structural validation rejects the input.\n\nFor MessagePack-to-JSON conversion, nested typeless extension wrappers can recurse through `ToJsonCore()` without the depth guard that the same function applies to arrays and maps.\n\n`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not fully mitigate these conversion paths because the missing checks occur inside JSON conversion and tokenization branches that do not consistently use the configured depth policy.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- APIs: `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson`, `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson`\n- Internal routines: `FromJsonCore`, `ToJsonCore`, `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken`\n- Data shapes: deeply nested JSON arrays/objects, long JSON separator runs, and nested typeless MessagePack extension values converted to JSON\n- Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe JSON-to-MessagePack fix should add explicit JSON nesting-depth accounting to `FromJsonCore`, using the configured maximum object graph depth or an equivalent limit, or rewrite the conversion to use an iterative bounded stack.\n\nThe tokenizer fix should replace separator self-recursion in `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` with an iterative loop so consecutive commas, colons, and whitespace do not consume stack frames.\n\nThe MessagePack-to-JSON fix should apply `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup around recursive `ToJsonCore()` calls made from the typeless extension branch, consistent with the existing array and map conversion branches.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, do not pass untrusted JSON directly to `ConvertFromJson`, and do not call `ConvertToJson` on untrusted MessagePack payloads that may contain typeless extension values. Validate JSON nesting depth with a parser that enforces depth limits before calling MessagePack-CSharp, reject malformed JSON before conversion, and apply strict input-size limits.\n\nInput-size limits reduce exposure but do not remove the recursive behavior in affected versions.\n\n## References\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`: `ConvertFromJson` unbounded structural recursion\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`: `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` separator self-recursion\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`: `ConvertToJson` ext-100 branch missing depth enforcement\n- CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion\n\n## CVE split rationale\n\nThese issues are grouped because they affect the same JSON conversion feature area and share the same failure mode: recursive conversion/tokenization paths do not consistently enforce depth or iteration bounds for attacker-controlled input. They are distinct from normal binary MessagePack skip recursion, dynamic union formatter depth accounting, DateTime stack allocation, and allocation-oriented denial-of-service issues.","published":"2026-06-22T21:14:20.241Z","modified":"2026-08-27T03:30:57.925649513Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00405,"percentile":0.34382,"asOf":"2026-09-17"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"NuGet","name":"MessagePack","fixedVersion":"2.5.301"},{"ecosystem":"NuGet","name":"MessagePack","fixedVersion":"3.1.7"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48512.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-cj9g-3mj2-g8vv"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48512"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-27T03:30:57.925649513Z"}}