{"id":"CVE-2026-47411","aliases":["GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq","PYSEC-2026-2937"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-47411","summary":"praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}","details":"## Summary\n\n**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`'s `update()` method.\n**Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=\"member\"`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.\n\n```python\n@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\nasync def update_workspace(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n    ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)  # <-- writes any value\n    if ws is None:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n    return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\n**Why it's wrong:** workspace name and settings are owner-tier fields. Renaming the workspace to a profanity is a low-impact griefing vector; rewriting the JSON `settings` blob is potentially a much higher-impact configuration injection (depending on what fields downstream code reads from `settings`, the attacker may flip feature flags, redirect webhook URLs, change LLM provider keys for shared configs, disable audit logging, etc.). The `require_workspace_member(min_role)` parameter is implemented and unused. This endpoint should require owner.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W` with role \"member\". State: attacker holds JWT.\n2. Attacker sends `PATCH /workspaces/W` with `Authorization: Bearer <attacker_jwt>` and body `{\"name\": \"Compromised\", \"description\": \"Owned by attacker\", \"settings\": {\"allow_public_invite\": true, \"ai_provider_url\": \"https://attacker.example/v1\"}}`. State: control flow enters `update_workspace`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W, attacker)` passes. `WorkspaceService.update(W, ...)` writes the three fields. State: workspace `W` now has attacker-chosen name, description, and settings.\n4. The settings JSON is read by any downstream code that consults workspace settings (LLM proxying, invite flows, webhook routing). If the deployment uses settings-keyed configuration overrides, those overrides now point at attacker-controlled endpoints.\n5. Final state: with one member-level token plus one PATCH, the attacker rewrites the workspace's metadata and settings, with effects ranging from cosmetic (rename) to substantive (settings-keyed config injection).\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality directly (though settings rewrites may enable indirect data exfiltration via attacker-pointed integration URLs), high integrity, no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** rewrite any workspace's name, description, and settings JSON. The actual blast radius depends on what fields the deployment reads from `settings` — but that field is documented as a free-form JSON blob, so any future configuration the platform adds there becomes attacker-tunable.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token in the target workspace.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate and the metadata rewrite is rejected with 403.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@\n @router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\n async def update_workspace(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),  # see member-update-role advisory for helper\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n     ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n     ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)\n     if ws is None:\n         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n     return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth: validate the keys allowed in `body.settings` against an allowlist so the field cannot become an arbitrary config-injection primitive even for owners. The four companion workspace-mutation endpoints (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `delete_workspace`) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.","published":"2026-07-21T17:02:48.081Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:44.679101674Z","cvss":{"score":6.5,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.00195,"percentile":0.09583,"asOf":"2026-08-20"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","name":"praisonai-platform","fixedVersion":"0.1.4"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47411.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47411"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:44.679101674Z"}}