{"id":"CVE-2026-46477","aliases":["GHSA-5h9v-837x-m97r"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-46477","summary":"Flowise: Dataset create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace dataset takeover","details":"## Summary\n\n**Type:** Mass assignment via `Object.assign(entity, body)` -> client-controlled `workspaceId` (and on create, `id`) overwritten on the Dataset entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.\n**File:** `packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts`\n**Root cause:** The Dataset controller/service constructs a `new Dataset()` and copies the request body into it via `Object.assign(...)` without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, `updatedDate`. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites `workspaceId` but not `id`; on update, it overwrites `id` but not `workspaceId`). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the dataset entity's sibling controllers and as `DocumentStore` before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts`\n\n```ts\n// create (line 203) and update (line 226)\nObject.assign(newDataset, body)         // <-- BUG: body.id, body.workspaceId accepted\n```\n\n**Why it's wrong:** `Object.assign(target, source)` copies every own enumerable property of `source` onto `target`. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so `workspaceId` set in the request body lands as the new `workspaceId` of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.\n2. Attacker creates a dataset in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity `id`.\n3. Attacker issues a `PUT /api/v1/datasets/<id>` (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes `\"workspaceId\": \"<workspace-B-id>\"` (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.\n4. The controller calls `Object.assign(updateEntity, body)`. The body's `workspaceId` overwrites the entity's `workspaceId` field. The persistence layer commits the row.\n5. Final state: the dataset row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member.\n**Attacker capability:** Any authenticated user with permission to update a dataset can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Datasets hold training / evaluation data scoped to a workspace. Moving a Dataset across workspaces via `workspaceId` overwrite exposes the dataset (rows, schema, references) to the destination workspace.\n**Preconditions:** Authenticated session with edit permission for the source dataset. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the `/api/v1/workspaces` listing or via any cross-referenced object's `workspaceId` field, so target enumeration is trivial.\n**Differential:** PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the `workspaceId` field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAlready fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6051 (allowlist pattern applied).\n\n```ts\n// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):\nconst updatedDataset = new Dataset()\nif (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedDataset.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1>\nif (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedDataset.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2>\n// ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client.\n```\n\nRegression tests should assert that a request body containing `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, or `updatedDate` is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.","published":"2026-06-08T15:31:48.952Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:28.986260022Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00335,"percentile":0.25914,"asOf":"2026-08-24"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"flowise","fixedVersion":"3.1.2"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6051","label":"FlowiseAI/Flowise#6051"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46477.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-5h9v-837x-m97r"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46477"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6051"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/49a2259bf2a6b4f3d4b50813cb5161cee0d40040"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:28.986260022Z"}}