# CVE-2026-43995: flowise SSRF — Fixed in 3.1.0

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

# CVE-2026-43995 — flowise

CVE-2026-43995 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in flowise. A fix is available for flowise — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)

Also known as[GHSA-qqvm-66q4-vf5c](/vulnerability/GHSA-qqvm-66q4-vf5c)

Published

May 11, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

## Exploitation Status

### Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

-   CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-43995.

## EPSS Exploitation Probability

[via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/)

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs41th percentile — riskier than 41% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

0.00%0.33%0.66%0.98%0.1%0.5%Jun 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/).

## Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

`flowise`npm

2Kdownloads / week

`flowise-components`npm

2Kdownloads / week

## Description

#### Summary

Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (`httpSecurity.ts`) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.

However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (`node-fetch`, `axios`Instead of using the secured wrapper.

Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.

This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.

#### Details

**Intended Security Model:**

All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:

```
packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts
```

This layer performs:

-   `HTTP_DENY_LIST` enforcement
-   IP resolution validation
-   IP pinning
-   Loopback blocking

**Observed Implementation Gap:**

Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.

Examples include:

-   `packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts`
-   `packages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts`
-   `packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts`
-   `packages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.ts`

These files directly execute:

```
importfetchfrom'node-fetch'
```

or invoke `axios` without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.

Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.

This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.

#### Root Cause

Security enforcement is not centralized.

Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.

Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.

This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.

#### PoC

Even when an administrator configures:

```
HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8
```

The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:

**Chat Prompt:**

```
Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
```

Execution flow:

1.  The LLM triggers `WebScraperTool`.
2.  The tool calls raw `fetch()` directly.
3.  No `httpSecurity.ts` validation is applied.
4.  The request reaches the metadata endpoint.
5.  The response is returned to the chat context.

This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.

#### Impact

**Severity:** Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

This issue:

-   Completely bypasses the centralized SSRF mitigation.
-   Allows access to internal network resources.
-   Enables the exploitation of cloud metadata and credential theft.
-   Invalidates the security assumptions of the recent patch.

Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.

#### Recommended Remediation

1.  Refactor all tools to use the centralized `secureFetch()` wrapper.
2.  Add ESLint `no-restricted-imports` rules to prohibit the direct usage of `node-fetch` or `axios` in tool components.
3.  Consider implementing a single internal HTTP client abstraction layer.
4.  Apply network-level egress filtering as defense-in-depth.

## Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem

Package

Vulnerable range

Fix

📦npm

`flowise` 

all versions

3.1.0`npm install flowise@3.1.0`

📦npm

`flowise-components` 

all versions

3.1.0`npm install flowise-components@3.1.0`

## Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

`flowise`flowiseai

< 3.1.0

range

## Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

1.  ### Detect
    
    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
    
2.  ### Fix
    
    Update flowise to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-43995 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
    
3.  ### Workarounds
    
    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
    

## Frequently Asked Questions

\### Summary Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (\`httpSecurity.ts\`) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic. However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (\`node-fetch\`, \`axios\`Instead of using the secured wrapper. Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch. This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulne

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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