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CVE-2026-43995 — flowise

CVE-2026-43995 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in flowise. A fix is available for flowise — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)

Also known asGHSA-qqvm-66q4-vf5c
Published
May 11, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-43995.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
flowisenpm
2Kdownloads / week
flowise-componentsnpm
4Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (httpSecurity.ts) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.

However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axiosInstead of using the secured wrapper.

Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.

This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.

Details

Intended Security Model:

All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:

packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts

This layer performs:

  • HTTP_DENY_LIST enforcement
  • IP resolution validation
  • IP pinning
  • Loopback blocking

Observed Implementation Gap:

Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.

Examples include:

  • packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts
  • packages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts
  • packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts
  • packages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.ts

These files directly execute:

importfetchfrom'node-fetch'

or invoke axios without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.

Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.

This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.

Root Cause

Security enforcement is not centralized.

Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.

Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.

This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.

PoC

Even when an administrator configures:

HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8

The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:

Chat Prompt:

Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Execution flow:

  1. The LLM triggers WebScraperTool.
  2. The tool calls raw fetch() directly.
  3. No httpSecurity.ts validation is applied.
  4. The request reaches the metadata endpoint.
  5. The response is returned to the chat context.

This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.

Impact

Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

This issue:

  • Completely bypasses the centralized SSRF mitigation.
  • Allows access to internal network resources.
  • Enables the exploitation of cloud metadata and credential theft.
  • Invalidates the security assumptions of the recent patch.

Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.

Recommended Remediation

  1. Refactor all tools to use the centralized secureFetch() wrapper.
  2. Add ESLint no-restricted-imports rules to prohibit the direct usage of node-fetch or axios in tool components.
  3. Consider implementing a single internal HTTP client abstraction layer.
  4. Apply network-level egress filtering as defense-in-depth.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmflowiseall versions3.1.0npm install flowise@3.1.0
📦npmflowise-componentsall versions3.1.0npm install flowise-components@3.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update flowise to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-43995 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-43995 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-43995. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (`httpSecurity.ts`) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic. However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (`node-fetch`, `axios`Instead of using the secured wrapper. Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch. This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulne
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-43995 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-43995 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-43995: flowise SSRF | O3 Security