{"id":"CVE-2026-42610","aliases":["GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-42610","summary":"Grav: Sensitive Information Disclosure via Accounts Service Bypass","details":"## Summary\nInformation disclosure exists in `Grav CMS v1.8.0-beta.29`. Despite previous security patches (notably in `v1.8.0-beta.27/28`) aimed at restricting sensitive object access within the Twig environment, the Accounts Service remains exposed.\n\nA low-privileged user (EX: Content Editor with only pages.update permissions) can bypass the existing Twig sandbox restrictions by utilizing the `grav['accounts']` service. Attacker can programmatically load administrative user objects and extract sensitive data, including Bcrypt password hashes and the security salt.\n\n## Affected version\nGrav CMS: `v1.8.0-beta.29` (and earlier 1.8.x beta versions).\n\nNote: This vulnerability persists even after the vendor attempted to mitigate similar SSTI vectors in earlier beta releases.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Create a low-privileged account (MY CASE IS 'editor_chen') with permissions limited to admin.login and basic page management (create, update, list). Ensure all administrative permissions (Configuration, User Accounts, ...) are explicitly Denied.\n\n2. Login to the Admin panel using `editor_chen`. Navigate to Pages and edit the `Home` page.\n\n\n3. Under the Advanced tab, ensure Process Twig is enabled .\n\n4. In the Content tab, inject the following Twig payload designed to bypass the `isDangerousFunction` filter by accessing the internal service container:\n```\n---\ntitle: Information Disclosure Test\nprocess:\n twig: true\n---\n# Security Audit Results\n- Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }}\n- Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}\n```\n\"GRAV\"\n\n\n5. Click Save. And navigate to the public page (`http://localhost:8000/home`). Page will render and display the administrator's Bcrypt hash and the system security salt.\n\"GRAV2\"\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## PoC\n```\n---\ntitle: Information Disclosure Test\nprocess:\n twig: true\n---\n# Security Audit Results\n- Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }}\n- Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAttackers can obtain the password hashes of all registered users, including Super Administrators.\n\nExtracted hashes can be subjected to offline brute-force or dictionary attacks (EX: USE Hashcat)\n\n## Video\nPls refer to the attached video\n\n\n\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)\n\nFixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`d904efc33`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/d904efc33) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**.\n\n**What changed:** the HMAC key formerly stored as `security.salt` in `user/config/security.yaml` has moved **out of the Config tree** into `user/config/security-private.php`. On upgrade, the existing salt value is migrated into the new file on first request (preserving CSRF nonces and sessions) and the key is scrubbed from both the live `Config` object and the on-disk YAML — so `{{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}` from a sandboxed Twig template now returns null. The `.php` extension is blocked from web access by the default `user/*.php` htaccess rule; the file contains only a `return` statement, so direct PHP exec produces no output either.\n\nThe PoC's password-hash half (`grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password')`) was already covered by the new Twig content sandbox in 2.0.0-beta.2 — `UserCollection::load` is not in the sandbox allowlist — see the separate GHSA-58hj-46fw-rcfm advisory.\n\n**Files:**\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php) — new `Security::getNonceKey()` + migration.\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php) — `generateNonceString` now uses the new key.\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php).\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php) — removed auto-gen of `security.salt`.\n- [`system/config/security.yaml`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/config/security.yaml) — removed placeholder `salt:`.\n- [`tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php) — migration + generation coverage.","published":"2026-05-11T15:19:35.066Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:29.884085858Z","cvss":{"score":6.5,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.0029,"percentile":0.21345,"asOf":"2026-08-14"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"getgrav/grav","fixedVersion":"2.0.0-beta.2"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/c66dfeb5ff679a1667678c6335eb9ff3255dfc47","label":"getgrav/grav@c66dfeb"},"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/42xxx/CVE-2026-42610.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42610"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/c66dfeb5ff679a1667678c6335eb9ff3255dfc47"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/getgrav/grav"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:29.884085858Z"}}