{"id":"CVE-2026-41583","aliases":["GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-41583","summary":"ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling","details":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the \"canonical\" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.","published":"2026-05-08T14:55:50.120Z","modified":"2026-08-07T11:31:33.289403832Z","cvss":null,"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"zebrad","fixedVersion":"4.3.1"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"zebra-script","fixedVersion":"5.0.2"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41583.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41583"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-07T11:31:33.289403832Z"}}