{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","aliases":["GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-35621","summary":"OpenClaw < 2026.3.24 - Privilege Escalation via chat.send to Allowlist Persistence","details":"> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.\n\nThis is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.\n\n## Details\n\nThe gateway's documented scope split is clear:\n\n- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action.\n- direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.\n\nThe vulnerable path is:\n\n1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`.\n2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.\n3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline.\n4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured.\n5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.\n6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)`, validates the result, and persists it with `writeConfigFile(validated.config)`.\n7. No sink-side check requires `operator.admin` before the persistent write occurs.\n\nThat creates a direct control-plane mismatch:\n\n- `config.patch` rejects the same caller with `missing scope: operator.admin`.\n- `/allowlist add dm ...` or `/allowlist add group ...` reached through `chat.send` can still rewrite channel authorization state.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A gateway client intentionally limited to `operator.write` can persist first-party channel authorization policy.\n- The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared `/allowlist` plumbing.\n- This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### 1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to `/allowlist`\n\nMirror the existing hardened pattern from `/config` and `/plugins`.\n\nBefore any config-backed `/allowlist add|remove` write, require:\n\n- `operator.admin` for internal gateway channels\n\nThis should happen before `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)` and before `writeConfigFile(...)`.\n\n### 2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement\n\n`configWrites` policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between `operator.write` and `operator.admin`.","published":"2026-04-10T16:03:09.856Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:43.969166661Z","cvss":null,"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"openclaw","fixedVersion":"2026.3.24"}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/35xxx/CVE-2026-35621.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35621"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-chat-send-to-allowlist-persistence"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:43.969166661Z"}}